或有事项信息披露的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Disclosure of Contingent Information

作　　者：仇萌 张俊瑞[1] 刘慧[2] QIU Meng;ZHANG Jun-rui;LIU Hui(Management School,Xi'an Jiaotong University,Xi'an 710049,China;Management School,Northwestern Polytechnical University,Xi'an 710072,China)

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049 [2]西北工业大学管理学院,陕西西安710072

出　　处：《统计与信息论坛》2020年第6期89-95,共7页Journal of Statistics and Information

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“管理层社会网络、多元化与企业盈余质量研究”(71472148);国家自然科学基金面上项目“基于投资者保护视角的或有事项披露及其经济后果研究”(71172186);财政部会计名家培养工程(财会(2015)14号)。

摘　　要：构建博弈模型,从不同角度分析或有事项信息披露的利益相关者之间的博弈关系,通过对各种结果的利弊情况进行对比分析,并以管理者的决策策略为切入点,利用完全信息静态博弈对企业或有事项信息披露问题进行研究。通过分析,揭示了博弈模型的博弈均衡结果,指出监管者要采取“双管齐下”的监管策略,即加强监管力度的同时,加重对违规行为的处罚力度才能起到有效的监管效果;同时,建议企业所有者设计合理的管理者薪酬激励,过高的薪酬绩效敏感度很可能“过犹不及”;此外,还提醒中小投资者警惕上市公司违规信息披露的行为,并做出合理的反应。A game model is construct,analyzing the game relationship among stakeholders with different information disclosure from different aspects.By comparing the pros and cons of various results,and taking the decision-making strategy of managers as the starting point.The static game of information has studied the issue of information disclosure of contingent issues.Through the analyses,the game equilibrium results of the game model are revealed,and it is pointed out that the regulators should adopt a"two-pronged"supervision strategy.It means that an effective supervision effect can be achieved by strengthening the supervision,as well as increasing the punishment for violations.Meanwhile,company managers are suggested to design a reasonable manager compensation incentives.Excessive salary performance sensitivity is likely to be"too much".In addition,it also reminds small and medium investors to be alert to listed companies'violations of information disclosure to make a reasonable response.

关 键 词：或有事项 信息披露 博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F231.5