物理主义不等于物理学主义--表述物理主义的一个新方案  

Physicalism Is Not Equal to Physics-ism--A New Solution to the Formulation of Physicalism

作　　者：王晓阳 WANG Xiaoyang

机构地区：[1]厦门大学哲学系,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《学术月刊》2020年第5期15-29,共15页Academic Monthly

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费项目(20720181103)和(20720191041)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：如何恰当地表述物理主义,是当前物理主义者面临的两大难题之一。常见的表述方案有四种:"基于物理学理论的"方案、"基于范型物理对象的"方案、循否法方案以及态度方案。对这四种方案的分析显示,它们目前均面临难以克服的困难,尤其是难以摆脱亨普尔两难或者泛心论的困扰。一个值得考虑的建议是,构造一个新型表述方案以克服这些困难。如果新方案是可行的,那么也表明,我们需要调整对物理主义的理解:物理主义不是一个经验论题,而是一个形上学论题。对物理主义的恰当理解不应当依赖于具体的科学理论,尤其是物理学理论。物理主义不等于物理学主义。How to formulate physicalism is one of the two difficult problems facing contemporary physicalists. There are four common solutions to the formulation of physicalism: theory-based solution,object-based solution, Via Negativa, and attitude solution. In this article, I first discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the four common solutions. Based on these, I propose a new solution and demonstrate that by virtue of the new solution, we can not only provide a proper definition for "the physical", but also deal with the main challenges facing the four common solutions, especially Hempel’s Dilemma and panpsychism.Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that the new solution is more plausible. Finally, I make it clear that if the new solution is more plausible, we should adjust our understanding of physicalism: physicalism is not an empirical thesis but a metaphysical one. A proper understanding of physicalism should not depend on empirical science, especially physics. Physicalism is not equal to physics-ism.

关 键 词：物理主义 物理学主义 亨普尔两难 泛心论 心灵哲学 

分 类 号：B0[哲学宗教—哲学理论]