Ownership Structure,Agency Relationship and Dividend Policy in unlisted Cameroonian Companies  

作　　者：MaïDjango WambéThérèse 

机构地区：[1]University of Ngaoundéré,Ngaoundéré,Cameroon

出　　处：《Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing》2020年第5期220-236,共17页现代会计与审计（英文版）

摘　　要：Financial decisions in general and dividend policy in particular are based on the relationship between the stakeholders.Also,analyzing the dividend policy in companies that are not listed on the stock market remains important.The object of our study is to analyze the agency relationship in the link between the ownership structure and the distribution of the dividend at the level of Cameroonian companies.We opted for a qualitative and quantitative study.The statistical tests carried out(with 67 companies)are the comparison test of means and the analysis of variance with one factor(using Statistic Package for Social Science[SPSS]software).The results of this research show that regular and irregular dividend payments lead to a low level of conflict between majority-minority shareholders and shareholder-managers.This leads to a negative relationship between the concentration,the ownership identity,and the dividend policy.

关 键 词：concentration of shareholding identity of shareholding dividend policy agency conflicts 

分 类 号：F42[经济管理—产业经济]