非对称性视角下跨境水资源冲突与合作的鹰鸽博弈模型  

Hawk-dove game model of transboundary water resources conflict and cooperation from an asymmetric perspective

作　　者：李芳[1,2] 吴凤平 陈柳鑫[1] 许霞 LI Fang;WU Feng-ping;CHEN Liu-xin;XU Xia(Business School,Hohai University,Nanjing Jiangsu 211100,China;National Engineering Research Center of Water Resources Efficient Utilization and Engineering Safety,Nanjing Jiangsu 210098,China)

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,江苏南京211100 [2]水资源高效利用与工程安全国家工程研究中心,江苏南京210098

出　　处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2020年第5期157-166,共10页China Population,Resources and Environment

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“跨境水资源确权与分配方法及保障体系研究”(批准号:17ZDA064)。

摘　　要：随着经济社会快速发展,全球用水量不断增加,加上气候变暖、水质恶化等问题,使跨境水资源逐渐成为各流域国争夺的稀缺资源。各流域国在跨境水资源开发利用中,冲突与合作频繁出现,充满着复杂性与不确定性。为探析各流域国策略选择的规律,促进跨境流域水资源合作,基于非对称性演化博弈模型,探讨跨境水资源各流域国的博弈策略动态演化过程。首先从地理位置差异、现状用水及需求差异、水资源开发利用能力差异三个角度出发,衡量流域国开发利用跨境水资源的实力值,以此界定流域国之间的非对称性,并基于非对称性“鹰鸽博弈”模型,探析各流域国策略选择的规律,分析非对称因子、冲突的单位成本收益对跨境流域系统稳定于合作状态概率的影响。然后考虑了跨境流域水资源合作中存在的额外收益,并将合作额外收益嵌入到非对称“鹰鸽博弈”模型中,探讨不同情景下,流域国合作额外收益对跨境水资源系统演化的影响。最后以印孟恒河水资源冲突为例进行分析,以理论与现实相结合的方式,探讨印孟水资源冲突难以得到永久解决的原因。研究表明:非对称性因子、冲突的单位成本收益和合作的额外收益都是影响流域国合作行为演化的重要因素,其中流域国非对称因子越大,冲突的单位成本收益越小,越有利于跨境水资源流域国合作行为的演化;合作的额外收益是流域国之间开展合作的重要动力。基于非对称性“鹰鸽博弈”模型对流域国合作演化规律进行探讨,以推动流域国开展合作,减少冲突,也为进一步解决全球跨境水资源的开发利用等问题提供参考。With the rapid economic and social development,the increasing global water consumption,coupled with the problems of climate warming and deteriorating water quality,transboundary river water resources have gradually become a scarce resource for the basin countries to compete for.In the development and utilization of transboundary river water resources,conflicats and cooperation frequently occur,which are full of complexity and uncertainty.In order to explore and analyze the rules of strategies-selection of each basin country and promote cooperation,Based on the asymmetric evolutionary game model,this article discussed the dynamic evolution process of game strategies in different basin countries with transboundary water resources.Firstly,from the perspectives of geographical location difference,current water use and demand difference,water resources development and utilization capacity difference,we measured the profitability of basin countries in the process of developing and utilizing transboundary water resources,and thus defined the asymmetric nature of basin countries.Then,based on the asymmetric‘hawk-dove game’model,we analyzed the rules of strategies-selection of each basin country and studied how the asymmetric factors and unit cost-benefit influenced the system stability.Secondly,we embedded the cooperative additional benefits into the asymmetric‘hawk-dove game’model and discussed the impact of the additional benefits of cooperation on the evolution of transboundary water resources systems in different scenarios.Finally,we analyzed the Ganges water resource conflict between India and Bangladesh and discussed the reason why it is hard for the two countries to permanently solve this conflict by taking both theories and reality into consideration.The research showed that:asymmetric factors,unit cost benefit of conflict and additional benefits of cooperation were all important factors affecting the evolution of cooperation among basin countries.The larger the asymmetric factors of basin countries,the s

关 键 词：非对称性 鹰鸽博弈 跨境水资源 合作演化 合作额外收益 

分 类 号：D99[政治法律—国际法学]