基于博弈理论的甩挂运输企业联盟条件与合作演化研究  

Study on Conditions and Cooperative Evolution of Alliance of Trailer Pick-up Transport Enterprises Based on Game Theory

作　　者：杨扬[1] 徐新扬 YANG Yang;XU Xin-yang(School of Transportation Engineering,Kunming University of Science and Technology,Kunming Yunnan 650500,China)

机构地区：[1]昆明理工大学交通工程学院,云南昆明650500

出　　处：《公路交通科技》2020年第5期140-148,共9页Journal of Highway and Transportation Research and Development

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71864022,71764013);昆明理工大学分析测试基金(2019M20182206037)。

摘　　要：为研究甩挂运输企业联盟后的收益是否符合预期,运用博弈论相关理论对甩挂运输企业选择联盟的条件以及联盟后的合作演化趋势进行了分析。基于古诺博弈模型建立甩挂运输企业单独经营与联盟经营业务的收益表达式,得出两种情况下投入运力、单位运力甩挂运输价格以及企业利润的均衡解,对比两种情形的利润差异得出甩挂运输企业进行联盟经营所需的基本联盟利益分配系数表达式。在甩挂运输企业选择联盟的基本条件基础上引入甩挂运输联盟风险因素,运用囚徒困境重复博弈模型通过4种情况对联盟后甩挂运输企业不同策略选择所形成的合作演化趋势进行分析。结果表明:独自经营时的甩挂运输企业市场规模大小与企业进行联盟经营的意愿成反比;企业间甩挂运输业务替代程度与联盟经营意愿成正比;企业运营成本对企业是否联盟有着决定性影响。对于甩挂运输企业成立联盟后合作趋势的研究发现:若想要甩挂运输联盟稳定,最完美的情况便是联盟内不存在破裂者;与此同时合作策略在任何时候都不会是收益最高的选择,只有当甩挂运输联盟中有足够及时止损者还有少数合作者时,联盟的合作趋于稳定。To study whether the profit after the establishment of trailer pick-up alliance is in line with expectation, the conditions of choosing alliance for trailer pick-up transport enterprises and the cooperation evolution trend after the alliance are analysed by using related theories of game theory. Based on the Cournot game model, the profit expressions of independent operation and alliance operation for trailer pick-up transport enterprises are established to obtain the equilibrium solution of input capacity, trailer pick-up transport price per unit capacity, and enterprises’ profits in 2 cases. By comparing the profit difference between the 2 cases, the expression of basic alliance profit distribution coefficient needed for alliance operation of trailer pick-up enterprises is obtained. Based on the basic conditions for the selection of the alliance, introducing the risk factors for trailer pick-up transport alliances, the cooperative evolutionary trends caused by different strategic choices of trailer pick-up transport enterprises after the alliance in 4 cases are analyzed by repeated game model of prisoner’s dilemma. It is found that(1) the market size of the trailer pick-up transport enterprises in independent operation is inversely proportional to the willingness of enterprises’ alliance operation;(2) the substitution degree of trailer pick-up transport business among enterprises is proportional to the willingness of enterprises’ alliance operation;(3) the operation cost of an enterprise has a decisive influence on the alliance. The research on the cooperative trend of the trailer pick-up enterprises after the alliance shows that(1)the perfect situation for the stable trailer pick-up transport alliance is that there is no disruptor in the alliance;(2) meanwhile, the cooperative strategy will not be the most profitable option at any time, and the cooperation of the alliance tends to be stable only when there are enough timely stop-loss players and a few partners in the trailer pick-up transport alliance.

关 键 词：运输经济 企业合作演化 古诺博弈模型 囚徒困境 甩挂运输联盟 

分 类 号：F542[经济管理—产业经济]