审计师妥协与底线思维——以股票期权激励为研究契机  

Auditor Compromise and Bottom-line Thinking:Taking Stock Option Incentive as a Research Opportunity

作　　者：曹圆圆 陈宋生[2] Cao Yuanyuan;Chen Songsheng

机构地区：[1]北京理工大学管理与经济学院,北京100081 [2]北京理工大学管理与经济学院会计系,北京100081

出　　处：《复印报刊资料（财务与会计导刊）（理论版）》2019年第7期113-125,共13页FINANCE & ACCOUNTING GUIDE

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71372016)。

摘　　要：以2007~2015年我国A股上市公司股票期权激励计划发布为契机进行研究,发现审计师会利用底线思维进行决策,其底线是客户的财务操纵诉讼风险,即在股权激励计划发布前一年,审计师倾向于向财务操纵诉讼风险低的客户妥协,表现为收取异常高的审计费用。进一步的研究表明,只有经济重要性程度高的客户才会触发审计师决策的底线思维。这一研究有助于明晰审计师面临公司管理层压力时的决策思路,揭示出客户动机是影响审计收费的因素,故可以利用股权激励公司的监管。Taking the planned announcement of stock option incentives in ChineseA-share listed companies from 2007 to 2015 as the research opportunity,we find that auditors usually use the bottom-line thinking to make a strategic decision,where the bottom line is clients’litigation risk of financial manipulation.That is,auditors are inclined to compromise on clients with lower risk of financial manipulation in the previous year before the planned announcement,when auditors would accept abnormally higher audit fees.Further research reveals that,auditors’bottom line thinking is only related to the clients with higher economic importance.The research helps to understand auditor’s strategic approach when facing management pressure,and states that clients’motivation can definitely affect audit fees,which can be used to supervise companies.

关 键 词：审计师妥协 底线思维 财务操纵诉讼风险 异常审计收费 股权激励 

分 类 号：F23[经济管理—会计学]