基于CIS值的非合作-合作两型博弈的理论研究  

Theory for biform games CIS value-based equilibrium strategies

作　　者：南江霞[1,2] 王盼盼 李登峰 NAN Jiang-xia;WANG Pan-pan;LI Deng-feng(School of Mathematics and Computing Science,Guilin University of Electronic Technology,Guilin 541004,China;Guangxi Colleges and Universities Key Laboratory of Data Analysis and Computation,Guilin 541004,China;School of Management and Economics,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 611731,China)

机构地区：[1]桂林电子科技大学数学与计算科学学院,广西桂林541004 [2]广西高校数据分析与计算重点实验室,广西桂林541004 [3]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都611731

出　　处：《控制与决策》2020年第6期1427-1434,共8页Control and Decision

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71231003,71561008,71961004,71801060);广西壮族自治区自然科学基金项目(2014GXNSFAA118010,2017GXNSFBA198182)

摘　　要：针对Brandenburger和Stuart提出的非合作-合作两型博弈中的不足,提出一种基于转归集中心值(CIS值)的非合作-合作两型博弈理论框架.用CIS值作为合作博弈阶段的解,进而构造获得非合作博弈阶段的纯策略纳什均衡解,并证明该类两型博弈解存在的条件.所提出的非合作-合作两型博弈的求解方法降低了非合作-合作两型博弈的解和有效策略存在的要求,适合于联盟外局中人的策略对联盟具有外部影响时的非合作-合作两型博弈问题,使非合作-合作两型博弈模型的应用更具有一般化,为供应链管理等问题提供新的理论依据.最后,通过数值实例表明所提出模型和方法的有效性和实用性.In order to make up for the deficiency of the solution of biform games proposed by Brandenburger and Stuart,the center of imputation set value(CIS value) is used to solve the cooperation game in the second stage of the biform games, and then pure strategy Nash equilibrium solutions of Non-cooperative games are obtained. Furthermore, the existence conditions of biform games based on the CIS value are proved. The proposed solution of biform games not only avoids the non-existence and non-uniqueness of the core, but also reduces the existence conditions of the solution of the biform game. The proposed method is suitable for the biform games, when no externalities of characteristic functions are not satisfied. It makes the application of the biform games model more general and provides a new theory for supply chain management and other issues. Finally, numerical examples illustrate the effectiveness and practicality of the proposed model.

关 键 词：非合作博弈 合作博弈 非合作-合作两型博弈 CIS值 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]