“委托代理理论”视角下的高校督查工作创新路径研究  

Innovative Paths to Improve the Supervision in Colleges and Universities from the Perspective of"Principal-agent Theory"

作　　者：李浩[1] 卢波[2] LI Hao;LU Bo(East China Normal University. Shanghai 200241, China)

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学传播学院,上海200241 [2]华东师范大学督查办公室,上海200241

出　　处：《山西高等学校社会科学学报》2020年第6期52-56,共5页Social Sciences Journal of Universities in Shanxi

摘　　要：高校督查工作近几年越来越受到重视,有别于政府机关,高校督查工作有其特殊性。在“委托代理理论”的视角下,构建了一个分析框架,尝试从减轻信息不对称、降低目标不一致两个维度对高校督查工作的发生机制进行探讨,从逆向选择和道德风险两个维度对存在的问题进行分析。在此基础上,从构建完整的督查工作格局,划分明晰的督查工作责权角度,探讨如何实现委托人与代理人的信息对称和目标一致问题,以期提高高校管理的执行效能。Over the past few years in colleges and universities,emphasis has been increasingly put on supervision,which is different from that of government agencies for its own features.From the perspective of"Principal-Agent Theory",this study aims to firstly explore the occurrence mechanism of supervision in universities and colleges from two dimensions——alleviating information asymmetry and reducing target inconsistency and then analyze the existing problems from the angles of adverse selection and moral hazard.On this basis,from the perspective of building a complete supervision work pattern and dividing clear supervision work responsibilities and rights,this paper discusses how to achieve the information symmetry and target consistency between the principal and the agent,in order to improve the implementation efficiency of university management.

关 键 词：委托代理 高校督查 创新路径 

分 类 号：G647[文化科学—高等教育学]