新经验主义的概念理论及其认知基础  

Neo-empirical Theory of Concepts and its Cognitive Basis

作　　者：郁锋[1] 冯艳霞 YU Feng;FENG Yan-xia(East China Normal University,Shanghai,200241;Boston Children’s Hospital,Department of Neurology)

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学哲学系,上海200241 [2]美国波士顿儿童医院神经学研究中心

出　　处：《科学．经济．社会》2020年第2期14-20,共7页Science Economy Society

摘　　要：本文将聚焦新经验主义的概念理论及其对传统学说的超越,引入"扁虫新大脑"的生理学实验对概念的"涉身经验性"进行诠释。我们认为,人类的概念并非只是外部现实的反映,而是被我们的身体、大脑,特别是感觉运动系统所塑造。This paper focuses on the conceptual theory of Neo-empiricism and its advantages to the traditional theory,and introduces the physiological experiment of"new brain of flatworm"to interpret the concept of"embodied experience".We believe that the concepts of human are not just the reflections of external reality,but are shaped by our body,brain,espe-cially the sensory motor systems.

关 键 词：新经验主义 概念 涉身性 

分 类 号：F403[经济管理—产业经济]