财政压力、地方政府行为与环境污染  

Financial Pressure, Local Government Behavior and Environmental Pollution

作　　者：郭晓辉 GUO Xiao-hui(School of Finance and taxation,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081,China)

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学财政税务学院,北京100081

出　　处：《贵州财经大学学报》2020年第4期101-110,共10页Journal of Guizhou University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“有效税率结构与区域经济增长:理论、实证和路径选择研究”(71263046)。

摘　　要：地方政府是生态环境治理的关键主体,财政压力以地方政府行为作为传导变量,对环境污染及其治理效果有深刻影响。实证检验地方政府行为的促污和治污效应对财政压力冲击的响应。结果表明:激励生产型地方政府行为促进污染增加,在财政压力下促进污染增加效应的激化,即压力越大越污染。环境治理型地方政府行为中的环境保护支出对污染治理有效,财政压力对其治污效应有提升作用;排污费征收不治污、反促污,财政高压使其促污效应强化。在财政增支减收、压力不断攀升的背景下,可从治理体制性财政压力诱因、强化对地方政府行为监督和约束以及优化治理工具提升环境治理绩效等方面来平抑财政压力通过地方政府行为引发的环境污染加剧。Local government is the key subject of ecological environment governance,Fiscal pressure has an important impact on environmental pollution with local government behavior as a conductive variable.This paper empirically examines the response of local government actions to the impact of financial pressure.The result shows that:Local government incentives for production have the effect of increasing pollution,and the greater the financial pressure,the more obvious the effect.Environmental protection expenditure is an effective tool to reduce environmental pollution.and fiscal pressure has an enhanced effect on pollution control.The collection of sewage discharge fees has no effect on reducing environmental pollution,on the contrary,it aggravates environmental pollution,fiscal pressures have intensified this pollution effect.In order to reduce the pollution effect of local government behavior,we can start from three aspects:eliminating the incentive of institutional financial pressure,strengthening the supervision and restraint of local government behavior,and optimizing the governance tools to improve environmental governance performance.

关 键 词：财政压力 地方政府行为 环境污染 激化效应 平抑路径 门槛模型 

分 类 号：F810.42[经济管理—财政学]