国际工程竞标中解开伯川德悖论的再思考  

Reconsideration of Solving Bertrand Paradox in International Project Bidding

作　　者：董少劼 Dong Shaojie(Norinco International Cooperation Ltd., Beijing 100040, China)

机构地区：[1]北方国际合作股份有限公司,北京100040

出　　处：《黑龙江科学》2020年第14期160-161,共2页Heilongjiang Science

摘　　要：中国对外承包企业在国际工程竞标中,经常陷入伯川德悖论造成的低价竞标博弈局势中。对如何帮助中国对外承包企业解开伯川德悖论再次做了较为深入地思考。通过分析和探讨,指出企业自身竞争优势、指标式的价格领导以及企业间合作共赢能够帮助中国对外承包企业解开伯川德悖论,从而避免在国际工程竞标中陷入伯川德博弈均衡中。In the international project competitions,Chinese international contractorsoften fall into Bertrand Paradox with low-price bidding.This paper re-considers and tries to solve Bertrand Paradox.Through analysis and discussion,the paper points out that contractor’s own competitive advantages,index price leadership,and win-win cooperation between contractors can help Chinese international contractors to solve Bertrand Paradox,so as to avoid falling into Bertrand game equilibrium in the international project bidding.

关 键 词：国际工程竞标 伯川德悖论 指标式的价格领导 合作共赢 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]