面向不同竞价机制的电力市场博弈均衡分析  

Game equilibrium analysis on electricity market orienting different bidding mechanisms

作　　者：别佩 王浩浩 王一 张妍 段秦刚 辜唯朕 陈启鑫[2] BIE Pei;WANG Haohao;WANG Yi;ZHANG Yan;DUAN Qingang;GU Weizhen;CHEN Qixin(Guangdong Power Exchange Center Co.,Ltd.,Guangzhou 510030,China;Department of Electrical Engineering,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084,China)

机构地区：[1]广东电力交易中心有限责任公司,广州510030 [2]清华大学电机系,北京100084

出　　处：《电力需求侧管理》2020年第4期2-7,共6页Power Demand Side Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(51537005);广东电力交易中心课题(GDKJXM20172986)。

摘　　要：我国正处于电力市场化改革的重要阶段,电力市场中的价格机制设计是市场建设的核心问题之一。针对价格机制中的竞价机制问题,对价差出清机制和全电价出清机制对于电力市场均衡的影响进行了探究。首先,建立双层模型模拟了不同竞价机制下的寡头电力市场中的博弈行为。随后,利用最优性条件对模型进行转化求解。最后,基于广东电力市场实例对无策略与策略性报价场景进行对比分析。研究发现,价差出清机制会造成机组成本扭曲,发电成本增加。然而,相较于全电价出清机制,价差出清也可能起到避免机组"搭便车"现象的作用,在一定程度上抑制策略主体动用市场力。China is in an important stage of electricity market reform.The design of price mechanism in electricity market is one of the core issues of market deregulation.For the bidding mechanism problem which is one of the price mechanism problems,the influence of relative price mechanism and absolute price mechanism on the equilibrium of electricity market is studied.Firstly,a bi-level model is established to simulate the game behaviors in the oligopoly power market under different pricing mechanisms.Subsequently,the model is solved by utilizing the optimality conditions.Finally,based on the case of Guangdong province,scenarios with strategic bidding and without strategic bidding are analyzed.It is found that the relative price mechanism leads to the distortion of unit cost and the increase of generation cost.Compared with the absolute price mechanism,the relative price mechanism can avoid the phenomenon of "free ride", reduce the demand cost,and inhibit the abusing of market power by strategic generator to some extent.

关 键 词：价差出清机制 全电价出清机制 电力市场 竞价机制 双层模型 均衡分析 

分 类 号：TM732[电气工程—电力系统及自动化] F104[经济管理—世界经济]