我国融资租赁行业风险的阶段性特征--来自不完全合同与演化博弈的解释  

The Periodic Characteristics of China’s Financial Leasing Industry Risk:An Explanation of Incomplete Contract and Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：崔佳宁 史燕平[2] Cui Jianing;Shi Yanping(Business College of Beijing Union University,Beijing 100025,China;School of International Trade and Economics of UIBE,Beijing 100025,China)

机构地区：[1]北京联合大学商务学院,北京100025 [2]对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院,北京100029

出　　处：《技术经济》2020年第5期149-155,共7页Journal of Technology Economics

摘　　要：本文通过不完全合同与演化博弈理论对我国融资租赁业发展过程中的波动以及当前的不稳定状态进行了解释。研究表明,从长期看,我国融资租赁业发展中的剧烈波动源于参与方的不断变动;而从短期看,现阶段我国融资租赁业的不稳定源于竞争结构与交易方式的不合理。因此在政策层面上,统一监管与出台《融资租赁法》成为当务之急。This study has explained the fluctuation and instability of China’s leasing industry by the theory of in complete contract and evolutionary economics.The results show that the fluctuation of China’s leasing industry is caused by volatility of different parties in the long run.But for the short term,the mess of China’s leasing industry is due to the unreasonable competition structure and trading mode.And from the policy perspective.the unified supervision and the introduction of the financial leasing law has become a curtail thing.

关 键 词：融资租赁 不完全合同 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]