语义的来源--以思维语言假说和意向性理论为视角  

On the Source of Semantics:From the Perspective of Mentalese Hypothesis and Intentionality Theory

作　　者：商卫星[1] SHANG Weixing(Institute of Philosophy and Culture,Wuhan Textile University,Wuhan 430073,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉纺织大学哲学与文化研究所,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《江苏海洋大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2020年第4期43-50,共8页Journal of Jiangsu Ocean University（Humanities & Social Sciences Edition）

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(15YJC870003)。

摘　　要：思维语言是心灵哲学和认知科学家们提出的一种假说,他们认为思维语言是人类个体在思维活动中专用的一种语言媒介,它与自然语言不同,而与计算机的机器语言相似,有一套特殊的、内在的符号系统,它能储存、载荷信息,并能被思维提取出来进行加工。自然语言的语义性来源于心理的意向性,而心理的意向性根源于思维语言的语义性。思维语言假说和意向性理论研究的进展,不仅是这两种理论自身的进展,同时也会对语义性问题研究提供关键支持。Mentalese is a hypothesis proposed by philosohers of the mind and cognitive scientists which thinks that mentalese is a kind of inner and specific symbol system which is different from natural language but similar to computer language during human’s thinking process.It has a special and internal symbol system,which can store and load information,and can be extracted by thinking for processing.The semantics of natural language comes from the intentionality of mind,while the intentionality of mind comes from the semantics of mentalese.The progress in the study of the hypothesis of mentalese and the theory of intentionality is not only the progress of the two theories themselves,but also the key support for the study of semantic issues.

关 键 词：思维语言 自然语言 意向性 语义 杰瑞·艾伦·福多 弗朗兹·布伦塔诺 埃德蒙德·胡塞尔 约翰·塞尔 

分 类 号：B085[哲学宗教—哲学理论]