可信联盟博弈的核仁和夏普里值  

Nucleolus and Shapley value of credibilistic coalitional game

作　　者：韩远 陈岩[1] HAN Yuan;CHEN Yan(College of Sciences,Shenyang University of Technology,110870,Shenyang,Liaoning,PRC)

机构地区：[1]沈阳工业大学理学院,辽宁省沈阳市110870

出　　处：《曲阜师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2020年第3期40-46,共7页Journal of Qufu Normal University(Natural Science)

基　　金：辽宁省科学技术厅科学技术计划项目:基于不确定信息的大规模非合作一致性群决策问题理论与应用(2019-ZD-0209).

摘　　要：研究了模糊联盟博弈,由于信息的不确定性,联盟支付视为模糊变量.基于可信性理论,在不同的决策环境中引入模糊排序方法表征局中人行为.因此,该文定义两种新的可信核仁和可信夏普里值,即模糊联盟博弈的解,并分别证明了新解存在性定理.其次,在现实模糊联盟博弈中,用算例说明该文研究内容的现实意义.最后,讨论两种可信核仁(可信夏普里值)之间可能存在的关系.The paper investigates fuzzy coalitional game.Coalitional payoffs are viewed as fuzzy variable because of uncertain information.Based on the credibility theory,fuzzy ranking methods are introduced to characterize the behaviors of players in different decision situations.Accordingly,two credibilistic nucleolus and credibilistic Shapley are defined,namely,the solutions of fuzzy coalitional game,and existence theorems of new solutions are given to confirm respectively.Secondly,numerical example is used to illustrate the significance of the theory developed in practical fuzzy coalitional games.Finally,we also discuss their relationships between two kinds of credibilistic nucleolus(credibilistic shapley value).

关 键 词：模糊变量 可信性测度 可信核仁 可信夏普里值 联盟博弈 

分 类 号：O159[理学—数学]