石油双寡头两阶段定价策略研究--基于参数空间变化的分析  

Research on Two-stage Pricing Strategy of Petroleum Duopoly--Analysis based on parameter spatial changes

作　　者：张雪峰[1] 宋鸽 闫勇[2] 

机构地区：[1]北方工业大学经济管理学院 [2]中国石油集团经济技术研究院

出　　处：《价格理论与实践》2020年第4期132-135,共4页Price:Theory & Practice

基　　金：北京市教委基本科研业务费项目,京津冀污染协同防治机制研究(11005291813-056);北方工业大学“一带一路”国家人才培养基地项目。

摘　　要：为解决寡头垄断带来的低效率问题,我国政府正积极探索有效的石油价格调控政策来激发石油行业的竞争性。本文基于Hotelling模型,考虑了参与人参数空间的变化和成本私有信息,构建了政府-石油双寡头两阶段不完全信息动态博弈模型,讨论了政府税收对成本异质性石油寡头垄断企业定价策略的影响,并通过数值模拟及案例分析进行实证研究。研究发现,政府-合理征税政策的制定会促进消费者福利的提高;影响石油寡头垄断企业市场份额的主要因素是成本差距,长期内石油双寡头降低成本和定价竞争行为会促进行业发展。因此,本文提出政府应切实考察石油企业成本及利润函数,科学征税以及通过鼓励企业加大研发投入激发行业竞争性和促进市场化程度的建议。In order to adjust the inefficiency caused by oligopoly,the Chinese government is actively exploring effective oil price regulation policies to stimulate the competitiveness of the oil industry.This paper discussed the influence of government tax on the pricing strategy of cost-heterogeneous oil oligopolies and the social welfare brought by the change of pricing strategy.Based on the change of parameter space of Hotelling model and the introduction of private cost information,a two-stage dynamic game model of government-oil duopoly was constructed.Numerical simulation and case analysis was carried on the demonstration.The main factor that affects the market share of oil oligopoly is the cost gap.Based on the above conclusion,the author puts forward policy suggestions that the government should examine the cost and profit functions of petroleum enterprises,collect taxes scientifically,and stimulate the industry competitiveness and marketization degree by encouraging enterprises to increase R&D investment.

关 键 词：石油寡头 不完全信息动态博弈 两阶段定价策略 HOTELLING模型 

分 类 号：F426.22[经济管理—产业经济] F274F224.32