劳动合同无法履行时的工资风险负担制度研究:以德美短工补贴制度为镜鉴  

A Study on Wage Risk Burden System When Labor Contracts Cannot Be Performed: Taking Germany-US Short-time Compensation as a Mirror

作　　者：刘国良 Liu Guoliang(School of Law,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学法学院,武汉430072

出　　处：《中国人力资源开发》2020年第6期28-43,共16页Human Resources Development of China

基　　金：国家社科基金项目(17BFX133)。

摘　　要：依据传统的雇主经营风险理论,因雇主方面发生了不可归责于劳动者的事由而致劳动合同无法履行时,雇主仍承担继续支付工资的义务。这种风险内化的方式,在遭遇经济普遍不景气的情势时,非常容易导致雇主以裁员的方式将其经营风险转嫁给劳动者承担。鉴于内化解决方式的不足,域外很多国家往往透过风险外化的解决方式—短工补贴,依据社会连带思维与保险原理,移转分散劳动者工时减少期间的收入损失风险,从而有效化解劳资内部冲突,进而实现劳资政共赢之局面。我国现有的稳岗补贴法律制度并不足以有效应对经济不景气下的经营危机,参照当下及未来的经济现实,有必要在突破劳资双方内部消化风险的基础上,借鉴域外经验,构筑一套适合我国的短工补贴制度。According to the traditional theory of employer’s business risk, if the labor contract cannot be performed due to the causes that cannot be attributed to the employee, the employer shall still assume the obligation to continue to pay wages. This kind of internalization of risk, in the face of the general economic downturn, it is very easy to lead employers to lay off workers in the way of their business risk to the workers to bear. In view of the deficiency of internalized solutions, many countries outside the region often adopt the risk externalization solution--shortterm labor subsidies, and transfer and disperse the risk of income loss during the period of reduction of labor hours according to the principle of social joint thinking and insurance, so as to effectively resolve the internal conflicts between labor and capital and realize the win-win situation of labor and government. China’s existing legal system is not enough to effectively deal with the business crisis under the economic recession. With reference to the current and future economic reality, it is necessary to break through the internal digestion of risks between labor and capital and learn from overseas experience to build a set of externalized burden system of wage risk suitable for China.

关 键 词：经营风险 劳资合意 稳岗补贴 失业保险 短工津贴 

分 类 号：D922.52[政治法律—民商法学]