药品集中招标采购中“串标”合谋的“囚徒困境”研究  

“Prisoner's Dilemma”of“Conspiracy”Collusion in Drug Concentration Bidding Procurement

作　　者：冯娜 温艳 赵威 FENG Na;WEN Yan;ZHAO Wei(School of Business, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266100, China)

机构地区：[1]青岛大学商学院,青岛266100

出　　处：《青岛大学学报（自然科学版）》2020年第2期135-139,共5页Journal of Qingdao University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：青岛市博士后应用研究项目(批准号:40518060048)资助;青岛市社科规划立项课题(批准号:QDSKL170166)资助。

摘　　要：针对药品招标采购中危及市场公平与人们健康用药的“串标”行为,以博弈论为基础,建立投标者与投标者之间的“囚徒困境”模型和相应的期望收益公式,分别讨论一次合谋和二次合谋的情况,详细地对各个影响因素进行分析。分析结果表明,政府应加大对“串标”行为的惩罚力度,建立健全监审制度,通过派入委托代理的方式提高审查力度,医疗机构也应改善采购方式,建立更加合理的采购程序。Aiming at the behavior of“stringing”that endanger market fairness and People's healthy use of medicine in the current procure ment of medicine.Based on game theory,the“prisoner’s dilemma”model and the corresponding expected income formula between the bidder and the bidder are established.The situation of a collusion and second collusion are discussed separately,and the influencing factor is analyzed in detail.It is showed that the government should intensify the punishment of the“stringing”behavior,establish and improve the supervision and examination system,and improve the review through the way of entrusted agent,and the medical institution should also improve the procurement method and establish more reasonable procurement procedure.

关 键 词：药品采购 “串标”合谋行为 “囚徒困境”博弈 

分 类 号：F424.2[经济管理—产业经济]