农业生产环节外包中服务质量控制契约研究  

Quality Control Contract Model of Service in Agricultural Production Outsourcing

作　　者：宦梅丽 侯云先[1] HUAN Mei-li;HOU Yun-xian(School of Economics and Management,China Agricultural University,Beijing 100083,China)

机构地区：[1]中国农业大学经济管理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《农林经济管理学报》2020年第3期288-296,共9页Journal of Agro-Forestry Economics and Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(14BGL062);国家“十二五”科技支撑计划项目(2014BAL07B05)。

摘　　要：基于博弈论和委托代理理论,考察由一个农户和一个社会化服务主体构成的二级供应链中社会化服务主体的服务质量投入和农户的服务质量监督决策问题。结果表明:(1)社会化服务主体在提供服务时存在降低服务质量投入水平的道德风险,农户为激励其提高服务质量投入需要支付“信息租金”。(2)农户在监督农业生产性服务时存在“过度监督”的道德风险,夸大服务质量不合格率。(3)运用最优化原理并进行算例分析发现,社会化服务主体提高服务质量投入水平,农户的服务质量监督水平下降;农户提高监督水平,供应链整体收益呈倒“U”型趋势。数值模拟仿真结果表明,所设计的农业生产性服务质量控制契约是可行的。据此,在农业生产环节外包中,服务主体和农户可以通过服务质量控制契约,以减小由于信息不对称导致的服务主体采取粗放型生产经营方式以及农户“过度监督”的双边道德风险,提高农业生产效率。Based on game theory and principal-agent theory,the study examined the decision-making of socialization services providers in service quality input and farmer in service quality supervision in secondary supply chain consisting of one farmer and one socialization services provider.The results show that:(1)Moral hazard exists in the process of services supply to reduce the quality of service,and“information rent”should be paid by farmers to encourage socialization services providers to improve service quality.(2)The disqualification of the service could be exaggerated by farmers in the supervision of the quality of agricultural production services,that is,“over-supervision”.(3)Using the optimization principle and example analysis,we found that when the socialization services providers increase the service quality input,the supervision of the farmers will decrease,and when the supervision of the farmers is improved,the overall revenue of the supply chain will show an inverted“U”shape trend.The results of numerical simulation show that the designed agricultural production service quality control contract model is feasible.Accordingly,it is necessary for socialization services providers and farmers to take measures such as signing a contract in outsourcing agricultural production stages.It helps improve efficiency through reducing the adoption of the extensive production mode by the services providers caused by information asymmetry as well as bilateral moral hazard resulting from farmers“over-supervision”.

关 键 词：社会化服务主体 质量控制契约 委托代理 双边道德风险 

分 类 号：F306.6[经济管理—产业经济]