自媒体时代质量安全信息对市场风险控制的机理研究  

Research on the Mechanism of Quality and Safety Information on Market Risk Control in the Self-Media Era

作　　者：赵晴晴[1] ZHAO Qingqing

机构地区：[1]天津中德应用技术大学,天津300350

出　　处：《科技创新与应用》2020年第24期36-38,共3页Technology Innovation and Application

基　　金：天津市科技计划项目技术创新引导专项优秀科技特派员项目(编号:19JCTPJC42400)。

摘　　要：在消费者与生产商信息不对称状态下,应用不完全信息动态博弈理论,分析质量安全信息对市场风险控制的机理,建立自媒体时代消费者以随机信息的模式发布信息对安全信息传递代价影响的数学模型。研究结果表明:高质量生产商发出的强信息,能够有效抑制低质量生产商的信息模仿,从而实现分离均衡。引导高质量生产商采用质量安全信息传递策略,帮助消费者准确识别质量水平,预防逆向市场选择风险。Under the condition of asymmetric information between consumers and production enterprises, the research applies the incomplete information dynamic games to analyze the action mechanism of supply chain quality and safety information for controlling market risk. The mathematic model about the influence on the cost of safety information transfer by consumers who release information via random signal mode in self-media era is proposed. It is found that the high-quality production enterprises could send a strong signal, which the low-quality production enterprises could not be able to imitate, so as to realize the condition of separating equilibrium with them. The high-quality production enterprises should apply the strategy of quality and safety information transfer and help customers to accurately identify the level of quality, in order to prevent the adverse market selection risk.

关 键 词：信息传递博弈 分离均衡 逆向选择风险 

分 类 号：F203[经济管理—国民经济]