央—地政府博弈、激励相容与流动人口社会保障制度协调机制  

Central-local Government Game,Incentive Compatibility, and Coordinative Mechanism of Social Security System for Floating Population

作　　者：贾洪波[1] JIA Hongbo

机构地区：[1]北京航空航天大学公共管理学院,北京100191

出　　处：《城市发展研究》2020年第6期124-131,140,共9页Urban Development Studies

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费项目(YWF-20-BJ-W-126);中央高校基本科研业务费项目(YWF-19-BJ-W-27);北京航空航天大学第一批人文社科拔尖人才项目(ZJ226S181J)。

摘　　要：导致流动人口社会保障制度不协调的原因之一是中央政府与地方政府委托—代理关系中地方政府存在道德风险。流动人口社会保障制度协调机制应该考虑中央政府和地方政府之间的信息不对称和激励相容问题,在信息成本尽可能低的情况下实现中央政府、地方政府利益与保障流动人口社会保障权利这一社会选择目标的一致性。构建了关于流动人口社会保障制度协调机制的中央政府和地方政府激励相容委托—代理博弈模型,提出了中央政府和地方政府激励相容促进流动人口社会保障制度协调机制建设的对策。One of the reasons for the uncoordinated social security system of the floating population is the moral hazard of local government in the principal-agent between the central and local government. The coordinative mechanism of social security system for floating population should consider asymmetric information and incentive compatibility between the central and local government, and achieve the consistency among the interests of the central and local government and the social choice goal for guaranteeing the floating population′s social security rights at the lowest possible information cost. This paper develops the principal-agent game model and puts forward the countermeasures of incentive compatibility between central and local government for developing the coordinative mechanism of social security system for floating population.

关 键 词：央—地政府博弈 激励相容 流动人口 社会保障 机制设计 

分 类 号：F842.684[经济管理—保险]