传统零售商渠道选择策略微分博弈模型  

Differential game model for channel selection strategies of traditional retailer

作　　者：周健[1] 张玉华 ZHOU Jian;ZHANG Yu-hua(College of Mechanical Engineering,Tongji University,Shanghai 201804,China)

机构地区：[1]同济大学机械与能源工程学院,上海201804

出　　处：《浙江大学学报（工学版）》2019年第9期1720-1727,共8页Journal of Zhejiang University：Engineering Science

基　　金：上海市博士后基金资助项目(11R21416500).

摘　　要：为了探究电子商务环境下,强势传统零售商应对电商冲击时的渠道结构选择问题,建立一个强势传统零售商与一个纯网络零售商的微分博弈模型.考虑产品需求受零售商商誉和定价的共同影响,分别针对强势传统零售商增设与不增设线上渠道这2种渠道结构选择情形构建模型,求解得出2种情形下传统零售商的最优定价和服务策略,并结合数学证明和数值实验对2种情形下的销量和利润进行比较.结果表明,强势传统零售商是否应当开设线上渠道与当前电子渠道市场的发展状况有关,当电子渠道市场份额扩大到一定程度时,与不增设线上渠道相比,增设线上渠道可以实现零售商本身总体销量和利润的提升,同时可以给顾客带来更好的服务体验,但零售价格更高.A differential game model between a strong traditional retailer and a pure online retailer was built,in order to explore the channel structure selection problem of strong traditional retailer in response to the shocks of online retailers in the environment of E-commerce.Considering that product demand is affected by retailer’s goodwill and pricing,a model was built for two kinds of channel structure choices of a strong traditional retailer with or without an additional online channel.The optimal pricing and service strategies of the traditional retailer were obtained under two conditions,respectively;sales and profits were compared by mathematical proof and numerical experiments.Results show that whether the strong traditional retailer should open online channel is relevant to the current development status of e-commerce market.When the share of electronic market expands to a certain extent,opening online channel will improve the retailer's overall sales and profits and bring a better service experience to customers,but the retail price is higher.

关 键 词：多渠道零售商 微分博弈 商誉 服务水平 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学] F272