隐性经济视角下中国环境污染治理困境及对策研究  

Study on the difficulties and countermeasures of environmental pollution control in China based on the perspective of implicit economy

作　　者：韩颖[1] 寇坡 HAN Ying;KOU Po(School of Business Administration,Northeast University,Shenyang Liaoning 110169,China)

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110169

出　　处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2020年第7期73-81,共9页China Population,Resources and Environment

基　　金：教育部社科基金一般规划项目“能源消费回弹效应的城乡异质、空间溢出与演变特征研究”(批准号:18YJA790031);国家社会科学基金重大项目“建立能源和水资源消耗、建设用地总量和强度双控市场化机制研究”(批准号:15ZDC034)。

摘　　要：将我国环境污染治理困境归咎于政府部门环境规制行为的缺失,无法解释当前环保高压下环境污染问题为何依然频发。本文将隐性经济纳入分析框架,构建了基于连续时间的地方政府与企业污染治理微分博弈模型,研究我国环境治理困境。考虑非产能预估和产能预估两种情形下的博弈主体的效用差异,得到了地方政府、污染企业各自的反馈均衡策略,研究发现:忽略隐性经济的存在,会高估政府环境规制实际作用效果;地方政府环境规制强度的提高和对污染企业超标排污行为的处罚,虽然能够减少官方经济活动造成的污染,但是却会加大隐性经济生产规模,导致企业污染行为向隐性生产部门转移,造成表面治污的现象;社会第三方举报概率和地方政府对企业隐性经济活动的惩罚力度处于高水平时,环境规制强度的提高对隐性经济的影响会减弱;产能预估状态下,我国实际污染状况得到有效抑制。同时,本文借助数值仿真发现,虽然产能预估可以改善环境状况,但是必须保障产能预估准确基础上,才有可能被政府部门采用。为突破当前我国环境治理困境,地方政府提高环境规制强度时,应构建畅通的公众诉求渠道,借助社会力量对企业隐性经济生产行为形成有效的监督;政府进行环境管制过程中,经济惩罚为辅,凸显刑事处罚,避免企业为弥补政府经济惩罚造成的利益损失,而进行隐性经济生产;建立健全产能预估制度和有效的激励机制,引导生产企业上报实际产能,扭转地方政府信息劣势,保障产能预估的准确性。The blame of the current dilemma of environmental pollution control on the lack of environmental regulation of government departments cannot explain why environmental pollution problems still occur frequently under the current high pressure of environmental protection.Incorporating the implicit economy in the analysis framework,this article attempts to construct a differential game model between local governments and polluting enterprises based on continuous time to study the dilemma of environmental governance in China.Considering the utility difference between the players in the two cases of non-production capacity prediction and production capacity prediction,the feedback equilibrium strategies of local governments and polluting enterprises are obtained.The study finds that:Ignoring the existence of the implicit economy will overestimate the actual effect of environmental regulation.Although the improvement of local governments’environmental regulation intensity and the punishment for the excessive emission of polluting enterprises can reduce the pollution caused by official economic activities,it will increase the production scale of the implicit economy and lead to poor pollution control.When the probability of third-party reports and the punishment imposed by local governments for recessive economic activities are at a high level,the impact of the improvement of the environmental regulation intensity on the implicit economy will be weakened.China’s actual pollution situation is effectively restrained under the condition of capacity prediction.Although capacity prediction can improve the environmental situation,the choice of this behavior can only be adopted by government departments on the basis of ensuring the accuracy of this prediction.In order to overcome the current dilemma of environmental governance in China,when local governments improve the intensity of environmental regulation,they should offer smooth channels for the public to voice their demands and form effective supervision systems for the

关 键 词：隐性经济 微分博弈 污染治理困境 产能预估 

分 类 号：X50[环境科学与工程—环境工程]