农户抵制、地方政府惩罚与跨期选择:宅基地征收中的博弈分析  

Farmers’Resistance,the Punitive Policies and Intertemporal Choice of Local Government:the Contest in Homestead Expropriation

作　　者：孙秋鹏[1] SUN Qiu-peng(Institute of Marxism,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing,100732)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院马克思主义研究院-海南热带海洋学院理论创新基地,北京100732

出　　处：《深圳大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2020年第4期92-102,共11页Journal of Shenzhen University：Humanities & Social Sciences

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目“新结构经济学的微观实证分析”(63192403);教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目“二元经济条件下的要素收入分配、经济增长与对外贸易失衡研究”(17YJA790034)。

摘　　要：宅基地尤其是城郊宅基地转化为城市建设用地过程中会出现土地大幅增值的情况,为了获得巨额土地增值收益,地方政府和农户之间会展开激烈博弈。地方政府和农户采取的博弈策略不仅影响各方的收益分配情况,还会影响宅基地征收数量和农村建设用地转化为城市建设用地的数量,进而影响土地资源配置效率和全社会的福利水平。博弈分析表明,农户完全配合地方政府征收的情况下,地方政府利用双边市场的垄断地位获得巨额收益,农户没有分享到土地增值收益。农户的抵制会使得地方政府减少宅基地的征收数量,农户抵制的强弱主要取决于土地征收价格与转让价格之间的价差,以及地方政府的惩罚造成农户成本增加的程度。地方政府在土地市场上拥有的双边垄断权不仅使城市土地使用者支付更高的价格,也降低了农村建设用地转化为城市建设用地的速度,减缓了中国的城镇化进程。未来土地市场需求上升的幅度越高,折现率越高,地方政府越倾向于提前囤地;融资成本越高,地方政府越倾向于减少囤地数量,甚至不囤地。When homesteads, especially suburban homesteads, are used for urban construction, their values increase significantly. To obtain the huge land value increment, local governments and farmers engage in fierce contests. The strategies adopted by local governments and farmers not only influence the benefit distribution of all parties involved, but also the amount of homestead expropriation and the conversion of rural construction land into urban construction land,thus affecting the efficiency of land resource allocation and social welfare. Analysis of the contests between local governments and farmers shows that when farmers are cooperative with local governments, local governments take advantage of their monopoly position in the market to gain huge benefits, while farmers do not share land value increment.When farmers resist, local governments reduce the amount of homestead expropriation. How strong the farmers’ resistance is depends on the difference between the land acquisition price and the transfer price, and the extent to which the local government’s punishment increases the cost of farmers. In the future, the higher the demand in the land market, the higher the discount rate will be, and the more inclined local governments are to hoard land in advance. The higher the financing cost, the more inclined local governments are to reduce the amount of land hoarded, or even not to hoard land.

关 键 词：宅基地 土地征收 地方政府 囤地行为 农户抗争 

分 类 号：F014[经济管理—政治经济学]