司法行政化背景下的市场分割——一个跨期合作选择模型  

Market Segmentation in the Context of Judicial Administrativization:A Theoretical Model of Intertemporal Cooperation Selection

作　　者：於勇成 褚红丽[2] 魏建[3] YU Yongcheng;CHU Hongli;WEI Jian(Zhongtai Securities,Jinan,250002;North University of China,Taiyuan,030051;Shandong University,Jinan,250014)

机构地区：[1]中泰证券股份有限公司博士后科研工作站 [2]中北大学经济与管理学院 [3]山东大学经济研究院

出　　处：《中国经济问题》2020年第4期122-136,共15页China Economic Studies

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目(19CJL041)和国家社科基金一般项目(18BJY090)的资助。

摘　　要：本文司法行政化背景下构建地方政府跨期合作博弈模型,研究在人力资本积累效应下造成地区市场分割的深层次原因。模型分析发现,两个地区分工合作所获得的市场份额与其初始技术水平和技术进步速度呈正相关关系,与其司法行政化程度呈负相关关系。同时,无论市场分割带来的人力资本积累效应能否弥补合作收益的损失,无论比较优势是否发生逆转,司法行政化程度较高的地区总有动机选择市场分割,而且,风险成本和交易成本越大,其选择市场分割的动机越强。因而,若想通过比较优势的逆转实现总效用的增加,必须提高技术进步速度、改善法治环境。In the context of judicial administrativization,this paper constructs a theoretical model of intertemporal cooperation selection of local governments under the human capital accumulation effect,and studies the underlying causes of regional market segmentation and low economic efficiency.It is found that the market share obtained by cooperation between the two regions is positively correlated with their initial technological level and the speed of technological progress,and negatively correlated with their degree of judicial administrativization.Whether the human capital accumulation effect of the segmented market can make up for the loss of the cooperative income or not,whether the comparative advantage is reversed or not,the motive to segment the market is stronger in the region with higher degree of judicial administrativization.And the larger the risk cost and the transaction cost is,the stronger motivation the local government with higher degree of judicial administrativization has to segment the market.Therefore,to solve the problem of market segmentation,we must improve our technological capability and improve the rule of law environment.

关 键 词：司法行政化 市场分割 技术进步 法治环境 

分 类 号：D926.1[政治法律—法学]