基于伯特兰德模型的航空企业与高铁的博弈分析  

Analysis on games between airlines and high-speed rail based on Bertrand model

作　　者：林贵华[1] 裴红波 邹远洋 Lin Guihua;Pei Hongbo;Zou Yuanyang(School of Management,Shanghai University,Shanghai 200444,China;School of Business Administration,Hubei University of Economics,Wuhan 430205,China)

机构地区：[1]上海大学管理学院,上海200444 [2]湖北经济学院工商管理学院,湖北武汉430205

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2020年第3期325-339,共15页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(11671250,11431004);教育部人文社会科学研究一般资助项目(15YJA630034).

摘　　要：基于差异化产品的伯特兰德模型,建立了航空企业之间以及航空企业与高速铁路之间在特定运输网络中的竞争与合作模型,以探究客运企业对不同竞争与合作情形的偏好以及对社会福利的影响.在模型中,航空企业以盈利最大化为目标,而高速铁路则以盈利与社会福利最大化为目标.研究结果表明,当高速铁路考虑较少或中等水平的社会福利时,最可能出现的是航空企业之间合作组成互补的航线联营;而当高速铁路考虑较多的社会福利时,在合作企业利润可再分配的条件下,最可能出现的是航空企业与高速铁路组成半互补的空铁联运.社会福利的最大化与各企业利润的最大化所导致的偏好并不一致,这表明企业的自身利益与社会福利之间存在冲突.Based on the differentiated Bertrand model,this paper establishes some competition and cooperation models for airlines and high-speed rail in the transportation network so as to reveal the preferences of passenger transport enterprises for different competition and cooperation situations and their impact on social welfare.In the models,the airlines aim at maximizing their profits and the high-speed rail aims at maximizing its profit and social welfare.The result shows that,when high-speed rail takes less or middle level social welfare,it is most likely to form a complementary route cooperation among airlines and,when high-speed rail takes more social welfare into account,it is most likely to form a semi-complementary air-rail transport under the condition of redistribution of the profits of the cooperative enterprises.The preferences maximizing the social welfare and those maximizing the profit for each enterprise are not consistent.This indicates that there is a conflict between the benefit of each enterprise and social welfare.

关 键 词：伯特兰德模型 博弈 航线联营 空铁联运 

分 类 号：TP273[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]