碳排放约束下双渠道供应链定价博弈策略  

Pricing Game Strategy of Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Carbon Emission Constraints

作　　者：司凤山[1] 王晶[1] 戴道明[1] 王玉玲[2] SI Fengshan;WANG Jing;DAI Daoming;WANG Yuling(School of Management Science and Engineering, Anhui University of Finance and Economics, Bengbu 233030, China;School of Economics, South-Central University for Nationalities, Wuhan 430074, China)

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学管理科学与工程学院,蚌埠233030 [2]中南民族大学经济学院,武汉430073

出　　处：《上海工程技术大学学报》2020年第2期181-187,共7页Journal of Shanghai University of Engineering Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(11626033);安徽省高校人文社科研究重点资助项目(SK2020A0025);安徽省高校自然科学研究重点资助项目(KJ2019A0662);中南民族大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(CSY18013)。

摘　　要：构建碳排放约束下双渠道供应链非线性规划模型,运用Karush-Kuhn-Tucker(KKT)条件探究分散决策下最优策略存在条件,对比分析不同组合情形下的最优策略,探讨碳排放限额对最优策略的影响.结果表明,无论零售商是否受碳排放限额约束,制造商受约束将会导致最优价格上涨和制造商利润下降,此时对制造商和消费者都不利;制造商受约束时对零售商利润的影响程度取决于零售商受约束状况.A nonlinear programming model of dual-channel supply chain with carbon emission constraints was constructed,and the existence conditions of the optimal strategy under decentralized decision making were explored by using the KKT conditions.The optimal strategies under different combinations were compared and analyzed.The influence of carbon emission limits on the optimal strategy was discussed.The results show that whether the retailer is restrained or not,the manufacturer’s restraint will lead to the rise of the optimal price and the decrease of the manufacturer’s profit,which will be disadvantageous to both the manufacturer and the consumer.The influence of manufacturer’s constraint on retailer’s profit depends on the state of retailer’s constraint.

关 键 词：碳排放约束 双渠道供应链 STACKELBERG博弈 组合优化 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]