Descartes’General Epistemology:A Contemporary Assessment  

作　　者：Tom Vinci 

机构地区：[1]Dalhousie University,Halifax,Nova Scotia,Canada

出　　处：《Journal of Philosophy Study》2020年第7期414-423,共10页哲学研究（英文版）

摘　　要：There is a broad distinction in Descartes’writings between doctrine and method.The staying power of these two elements has been unequal.Descartes’doctrinal influence on contemporary epistemology has been largely as a foil against which some of its major currents have been developed.The situation is brighter on the methodological side.Here Descartes’practice of beginning with common sense and moving,step by step,to philosophical conclusions is a practice much admired by contemporary philosophers.Still,the negative verdict on doctrine stands as the main verdict overall.I maintain that this verdict is undeserved.I first distinguish between Descartes’general epistemology and the purpose to which he puts it—the quest for certainty.I then argue for a positive verdict for his general epistemology.I do so by showing that Descartes has a non-normative account of knowledge but an“ethics of belief”in which the knowing comes first.Descartes thus anticipates what Sylvan calls the“knowledge-first”approach in general epistemology,which I defend.Relying on Audi’s distinction between“sources”and“reasons,”I show that Descartes’analysis of knowledge proper,which I also defend,anticipates and improves the“factive access”analysis of knowledge due to McDowell.

关 键 词：general epistemology analysis of knowledge NORMATIVITY REASONS DESCARTES 

分 类 号：B08[哲学宗教—哲学理论]