财政层级改革与税收征管激励重构——以财政“省直管县”改革为自然实验的研究  

Reform of Fiscal Hierarchy and Reconstruction of Tax Enforcement Incentive:Evidence from“PMC”Reform in Fiscal

作　　者：李广众[1,2] 贾凡胜 Li Guangzhong;Jia Fansheng

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院 [2]中山大学高级金融研究院 [3]中国海洋大学管理学院 [4]中国企业营运资金管理研究中心

出　　处：《管理世界》2020年第8期32-49,235,共19页Journal of Management World

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71802200、71772190、71991474);教育部人文社科基金(17YJC790058);中国海洋大学“青年英才工程”的资助。

摘　　要：本文基于中国工业企业数据,以财政"省直管县"改革为自然实验,从企业避税的角度考察由财政层级改革带来的市级政府财政压力能否激励其加强税收征管。研究发现,经历财政"省直管县"改革后,市辖区域内企业的避税程度会显著降低,表明面临财政压力,政府会加强税收征管,进而抑制企业避税;这一结论在考虑了动态效应、安慰剂效应、倾向得分匹配+双重差分法(PSM+DID)、测量误差和子样本分析等一系列稳健性之后仍然成立。本文还发现:财政"省直管县"改革对企业避税的影响仅在市级政府拥有征管权限的企业中显著;市级政府土地财政能力会削弱财政"省直管县"改革对企业避税行为的影响。本文的研究丰富了政府财政层级改革及其影响的文献,对于如何重构政府税收征管激励、深化机构和行政体制改革以及提升国家治理能力具有借鉴意义。This study investigates how fiscal hierarchy reform influence the tax enforcement incentive of local government from the perspective of enterprise tax evasion by using the data of the Chinese industrial enterprises from 1998 to 2006 as a sample.We find that when the municipal government experiences a fiscal squeeze,the tax evasion rate of enterprises within its jurisdiction significantly reduces,indicating that the government enhances tax enforcement in pre-venting enterprise tax evasion behavior when fiscal income shrinks.Moreover,this conclusion holds when considering the dynamic effect,placebo efct,PSM+DID,measurement error,and subsample analysis and other robustness tests.This paper further finds that:(1)the alternative income of municipal governments weakens the impact of Fiscal Squeeze on enterprise tax evasion;and(2)The impact of Fiscal Squeeze on enterprise tax evasion is only significant in the enterprises that the municipal government has the authority of collection and management.This study not only enriches the literature on government taxation efforts and corporate financial behaviors,but also provides empirical evi-dence for fiscal and taxation systems and government-level reforms.

关 键 词：财政“省直管县” 财政收入缩水 税收征管 企业避税 

分 类 号：F812[经济管理—财政学] F425