考虑随机干扰的政企救灾协同策略研究  

A Study on Government-Enterprise Disaster Relief Coordination Strategy Considering Random Interference

作　　者：宋晓彤 张桂涛[1] 张晓彤 SONG Xiao-tong;ZHANG Gui-tao;ZHANG Xiao-tong(Business School,Qingdao University,Qingdao 266071,China)

机构地区：[1]青岛大学商学院,山东青岛266071

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2020年第14期135-146,共12页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学规划项目(17YJA630130)。

摘　　要：考虑了随机干扰因素对政企协同救灾策略的影响,建立了Nash非合作博弈,成本分担Stackelberg博弈和协同合作契约三种随机微分博弈模型,并分别求得了Nash非合作博弈、Stackelberg主从博弈和协同合作博弈情形下的最优救灾策略及收益.通过对比分析均衡结果,发现:协同合作情形下的期望值和方差最大,成本分担情形的期望值和方差次之,无成本分担期望值和方差最小,说明在随机因素的干扰下,政府和企业要想获得更高的系统效益,就需要承担更大的风险,收益与风险相伴随.同时发现,随机因素干扰使得真实值与其预期值存在偏差,但在一定可信度下,它们总是围绕期望值波动并且被控制在一定范围内.Considering the influence of random distractors upon best relief strategies of company and government,construct three stochastic differential game which are nash noncooperative,cost-sharing stackelberg and coordinated respectively.By deriving the best relief strategies under three scenarios and analyzing the equilibrium,it’s found that expectation value and variance is bigest under cooperative pattern and smallest under noncooperative pattern,which means that company and government should bear higher risk to achieve better revenue.Meanwhile,it’s also shown that there is difference between real value and expected value due to the distractors and it will always fluctutate around the expectation value under certain credence value.

关 键 词：政企救灾 协同 随机 微分博弈 

分 类 号：D632.5[政治法律—政治学] O225[政治法律—中外政治制度]