一致同意的理由:审视公共选择的行动逻辑及其规范内涵  

The Logical and Ethical Foundations of Public Choice Theory

作　　者：方钦[1] 李钧 Fang Qin;Li Jun

机构地区：[1]复旦大学经济学院,上海200433 [2]浙江财经大学财政税务学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《学术研究》2020年第8期98-105,178,共9页Academic Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“大卫·刘易斯的惯例理论及其对当代经济学制度分析的影响研究”(18BJL010)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：由布坎南和图洛克创立的公共选择理论存在两个饱受争议的核心要素:"交易的政治理论"和"一致同意规则"。本文结合布坎南后期的"元规则偏好"理论,将《同意的计算》一书中提出的元规则模型拓展为二阶元规则选择模型,证明在允许多次选择的情形下,公共选择的基本逻辑符合当年布坎南和图洛克的判断。首先,一致同意规则并非公共选择理论模型的前提条件,而是参与集体决策过程的个人进行理性计算的必然结果;其次,作为理性计算的结果,一致同意规则也就具备了伦理内涵,人们出于自身利益的考量而尊重他人的选择;最后,"交易的政治理论"能够适用于当代社会科学分析。In The Calculus of Consent,James M.Buchanan and Gordon Tullock presented two essential elements of the public choice theory,which are also highly controversial,one is politics as exchange;the other is the rule of unanimity.In this article,we are going to review these two elements from a different point of view.By using the theory of constitutional preferences to analyze the Buchanan’s Paradox,which was presented in The Calculus of Consent,we can deduce Locke’s solution from Hobbes’s solution,and solve the paradox.Then we will found the normative implications of the rule of unanimity,and understand the true meaning of politics as exchange.

关 键 词：布坎南悖论 一致同意规则 元规则理论 决策成本 正义原则 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学]