检索规则说明:AND代表“并且”;OR代表“或者”;NOT代表“不包含”;(注意必须大写,运算符两边需空一格)
检 索 范 例 :范例一: (K=图书馆学 OR K=情报学) AND A=范并思 范例二:J=计算机应用与软件 AND (U=C++ OR U=Basic) NOT M=Visual
作 者:陈苏 CHEN Su(School of Economics, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang,Jiangxi 330013)
出 处:《江南大学学报(人文社会科学版)》2020年第4期56-66,共11页Journal of Jiangnan University:Humanities & Social Sciences Edition
基 金:教育部人文社科项目(20YJC790014);中国博士后科学基金面上项目(2019M662263);江西省教育厅科技项目(GJJ180281)等资助。
摘 要:文章基于风险规避和博弈能力视角,回顾了历史上土地租佃制度的变迁及其租佃形态特征,得到的结论是自唐中后期以来,土地租佃制度的发展较为稳定,且当地租增值难以实现,即自然灾害等风险因素使得粮食亩产上升缓慢或不变时,博弈能力是影响土地租佃制度的一个重要决定因素。唐中后期,大土地所有制再次快速发展,地主的博弈能力较强,所以土地租佃制度以定额租制为主;北宋以后,地主的经济力量减弱,博弈能力下降,佃农的博弈能力上升,所以土地租佃制度以分成租制为主。当地租具有增值的可能,即粮食亩产具有提高的潜力时,定额租制对地主和佃农都有利,南宋和清代前期就表现出了这一特征。总之,地主与佃农之间力量的较量,均是为了实现各自利益最大化,从而进行地租博弈,这是一种你得即我失的零和博弈。This paper reviews the historical changes of land tenancy system and the characteristics of tenancy form from the perspective of risk aversion and game ability.It was found that since the middle and late Tang period,the development of the land tenancy system had been relatively stable.The local rent increase was difficult to realize,namely,the risk factors such as natural disasters led to slow or non-increase in the grain yield per mu,and game ability is an important determinant of the land contract system.In the middle and late Tang Dynasty,the landlord's economic power grew relatively strong and their game ability strong.Therefore,the land contract system was dominated by the fixed rent system;after the Northern Song Dynasty,the landlord's economic power weakened,which in turn weakened their game ability,and the tenant's bargaining ability increased,so the land contract system was divided rent system.When the local rent has the potential to increase,that is,when the grain yield has the potential to increase,the fixed rent system is beneficial to landowners and tenants.The Southern Song Dynasty and the early Qing Dynasty demonstrated this characteristic.
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在链接到云南高校图书馆文献保障联盟下载...
云南高校图书馆联盟文献共享服务平台 版权所有©
您的IP:216.73.216.15