土地租佃制度演变的历史考察——基于风险规避和博弈能力视角  被引量:7

Historical Investigation on the Evolution of Land Tenancy System:Exploration from the Perspective of Risk Aversion and Game Ability

在线阅读下载全文

作  者:陈苏 CHEN Su(School of Economics, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang,Jiangxi 330013)

机构地区:[1]江西财经大学经济学院,江西南昌330013

出  处:《江南大学学报(人文社会科学版)》2020年第4期56-66,共11页Journal of Jiangnan University:Humanities & Social Sciences Edition

基  金:教育部人文社科项目(20YJC790014);中国博士后科学基金面上项目(2019M662263);江西省教育厅科技项目(GJJ180281)等资助。

摘  要:文章基于风险规避和博弈能力视角,回顾了历史上土地租佃制度的变迁及其租佃形态特征,得到的结论是自唐中后期以来,土地租佃制度的发展较为稳定,且当地租增值难以实现,即自然灾害等风险因素使得粮食亩产上升缓慢或不变时,博弈能力是影响土地租佃制度的一个重要决定因素。唐中后期,大土地所有制再次快速发展,地主的博弈能力较强,所以土地租佃制度以定额租制为主;北宋以后,地主的经济力量减弱,博弈能力下降,佃农的博弈能力上升,所以土地租佃制度以分成租制为主。当地租具有增值的可能,即粮食亩产具有提高的潜力时,定额租制对地主和佃农都有利,南宋和清代前期就表现出了这一特征。总之,地主与佃农之间力量的较量,均是为了实现各自利益最大化,从而进行地租博弈,这是一种你得即我失的零和博弈。This paper reviews the historical changes of land tenancy system and the characteristics of tenancy form from the perspective of risk aversion and game ability.It was found that since the middle and late Tang period,the development of the land tenancy system had been relatively stable.The local rent increase was difficult to realize,namely,the risk factors such as natural disasters led to slow or non-increase in the grain yield per mu,and game ability is an important determinant of the land contract system.In the middle and late Tang Dynasty,the landlord's economic power grew relatively strong and their game ability strong.Therefore,the land contract system was dominated by the fixed rent system;after the Northern Song Dynasty,the landlord's economic power weakened,which in turn weakened their game ability,and the tenant's bargaining ability increased,so the land contract system was divided rent system.When the local rent has the potential to increase,that is,when the grain yield has the potential to increase,the fixed rent system is beneficial to landowners and tenants.The Southern Song Dynasty and the early Qing Dynasty demonstrated this characteristic.

关 键 词:风险规避 博弈能力 租佃制度 演变 

分 类 号:F321.1[经济管理—产业经济]

 

参考文献:

正在载入数据...

 

二级参考文献:

正在载入数据...

 

耦合文献:

正在载入数据...

 

引证文献:

正在载入数据...

 

二级引证文献:

正在载入数据...

 

同被引文献:

正在载入数据...

 

相关期刊文献:

正在载入数据...

相关的主题
相关的作者对象
相关的机构对象