纵向政府间关系中的督察制度:以中央环保督察为研究对象  

The Supervision System in Vertical Inter-Governmental Relationship:Taking Central Environmental Protection Supervision as a Case

作　　者：郁建兴[1] 刘殷东 YU Jianxing;LIU Yindong

机构地区：[1]浙江大学公共管理学院/国家制度研究院,浙江杭州310058 [2]浙江大学公共管理学院,浙江杭州310058

出　　处：《学术月刊》2020年第7期69-80,共12页Academic Monthly

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(18ZDA116);浙江大学国家制度研究院重大委托项目(YQWT2001)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：推进国家治理体系和治理能力的现代化,亟需增强中央与地方纵向治理的制度供给。长期以来,央地委托-代理关系中地方政府的执行异化是中国纵向治理中的一大难题。党的十八大后,中央政府在治理实践中明显增加督察制度的启用,但学术界对这一制度在纵向政府间关系中的角色、意义和运行机制尚缺乏系统研究。通过考察中央环保督察在浙江省的具体实施,可以看到,督察制度借助中央权威,实施自上而下的高强度控制,通过动员、进驻、反馈、整改、问责、"回头看"等完整程序,制度性地嵌入治理体系,降低了委托-代理关系中的信息不对称性,实现了对地方治理目标的纠偏,从而有效强化了制度执行,提升了纵向治理效能。In order to promote the modernization of national governance system and governance capacity,it is important to strengthen the system supply of the vertical governance between the central government and local governments.The implementation deviation of local governments has always been a big issue in China’s vertical governance.In tackling with this problem,the central government has largely increased the use of supervision system in the governance practice since the 18 th CPC National Congress.However,few study explored the role,significance and operation mechanism of this system in vertical inter-governmental relationship.By examining the case of the central environmental protection supervision implementation in Zhejiang province,we found that the supervision system with the authority of the central government exerts the top-down high-intensity control,systematically embeds the governance system through the overall procedures of mobilization,implementation,feedback,rectification,accountability and follow-up reexaminations,reduces the information asymmetry,and corrects the target deviation.In this way,it effectively strengthens the effectiveness of implementation and improve the efficiency of vertical governance.

关 键 词：中央与地方关系 督察制度 中央环保督察 委托-代理理论 

分 类 号：D6[政治法律—政治学]