纵向高管兼任与审计师选择:信号传递VS寻租  

Vertical Interlocks of Executives and Auditor Choice:Signaling VS Rent Seeking

作　　者：宋衍蘅[1] 毕煜晗 宋云玲[2] SONG Yanheng;BI Yuhan;SONG Yunling(School of International Business, Beijing Foreign Studies University, Beijing 100089, China;School of Economics and Management, Inner Mongolia University, Huhhot 010021, China)

机构地区：[1]北京外国语大学国际商学院,北京100089 [2]内蒙古大学经济管理学院,内蒙古呼和浩特010021

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2020年第4期47-57,共11页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71472165);国家自然科学基金地区项目(71762023);北京外国语大学基本科研业务费项目(2021JJ021)。

摘　　要：存在纵向高管兼任的公司更愿意选择高质量审计师来传递信号(信号传递假说),还是选择低质量审计师以规避可能的监督(寻租假说)?基于2009—2018年中国沪深A股上市公司的数据分析结果表明,存在纵向高管兼任的公司选择“国际四大”的可能性显著降低,但是,选择“本土大所”的可能性却显著增加。而且,这种现象在大股东不存在股权质押的情况下更加显著。进一步研究发现,“国际四大”和“本土大所”对纵向高管兼任的反应不同。相比“本土大所”,“国际四大”对这类公司的审计投入更多,审计收费更高。但是,两者的审计质量却并没有显著差异。研究结论拓展了有关审计师选择影响因素和纵向高管兼任经济后果的研究,也有助于进一步理解公司在“国际四大”和“本土大所”选择方面的思考。Do companies with vertically interlocked executives select high-quality auditors to convey good news(signaling hypothesis),or select low-quality auditors to avoid possible supervision(rent seeking hypothesis)?Using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2018,this paper empirically examines how companies with vertically interlocked executives choose their auditors.The results indicate that companies with vertically interlocked executives are less likely to choose international“Big 4”and more likely to choose domestic“Big firms”.This phenomenon is more profound in samples without a pledge of the controlling shareholder's equity.Further analysis shows that international“Big 4”and domestic“Big firms”take different attitudes toward companies with vertically interlocked executives.International“Big 4”increases audit resources significantly and charges more,compared to domestic“Big firms”.On the other hand,audit quality shows no significant difference between the two types of auditors.Our results expand the research on the determinants of auditor choice and the economic consequences of vertical interlocks of executives.It also helps to understand the consideration of companies in selecting international“Big 4”and domestic“Big firms”.

关 键 词：纵向高管兼任 审计师选择 审计费用 审计意见 审计质量 盈余管理 

分 类 号：F239.43[经济管理—会计学]