基于多阶段网络欺骗博弈的主动防御研究  

Research on active defense based on multi-stage cyber deception game

作　　者：胡永进[1] 马骏[1] 郭渊博[1] 张晗[1,2] HU Yongjin;MA Jun;GUO Yuanbo;ZHANG Han(Department of Cryptogram Engineering,Information Engineering University,Zhengzhou 450001,China;Software College,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China)

机构地区：[1]信息工程大学密码工程学院,河南郑州450001 [2]郑州大学软件学院,河南郑州450001

出　　处：《通信学报》2020年第8期32-42,共11页Journal on Communications

基　　金：信息保障技术重点实验室开放基金资助项目(No.KJ-15-108)。

摘　　要：针对网络攻击者需要依赖探测到的信息决定下一步动作这一特点,将非合作信号博弈理论应用于网络攻防分析。通过构建多阶段网络欺骗博弈模型,对网络攻防过程中存在的信号欺骗机制进行深入研究,充分考虑网络欺骗信号衰减作用,实现多阶段网络攻防对抗的动态分析推演。基于攻防分析改进了多阶段网络欺骗博弈均衡求解方法,并设计出最优网络欺骗防御策略选取算法。仿真实验验证了所提模型和方法的有效性,根据实验结果对多阶段网络欺骗博弈存在的规律进行了分析总结,能够为网络安全主动防御研究提供有效指导。In view of the characteristic that attacker depended on the detected information to decide the next actions,the non-cooperative signal game theory was applied to analyze cyber attack and defense.The signal deception mechanism in the process of cyber attack and defense was considered deeply by constructing a multi-stage cyber deception game model,and the dynamic analysis and deduction of the multi-stage cyber attack and defense was realized by considering the attenuation of cyber deception signals.A solution for multi-stage cyber deception game equilibrium was improved based on analysis of cyber attack and defense,and an optimal algorithm for selecting cyber deception defense strategies was designed.The effectiveness of the model is verified by simulations.The rules of multi-stage cyber deception games are summarized based on the results,which can provide effective guidance for the research on cyber active defense.

关 键 词：网络攻防 信号博弈 网络欺骗 主动防御 策略选取 

分 类 号：TP393[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]