博弈论视角下公众参与环境保护的司法路径优化  

Judicial Path Optimization of Public Participation in Environmental Protection from the Perspective of Game Theory

作　　者：王清粤 常健 WANG Qingyue;CHANG Jian

机构地区：[1]华中师范大学法学院 [2]海南大学法学院

出　　处：《中国矿业大学学报（社会科学版）》2020年第5期80-90,共11页Journal of China University of Mining & Technology(Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社科基金项目“公司双层股权结构的法律构造研究”(项目编号:19BFX131)。

摘　　要：博弈论作为分析人类行为的一种重要理论和工具,在法学、经济学及管理学等领域得到了充分应用。在博弈参与人、主体理性、信息不完全对称的前提假设下,构建公众与司法机关之间关于环境保护的动态博弈模型,得出了需要加强制度规范、降低公众维权成本、实施适当的激励机制以及加强信息透明度的结论。我国公众参与环境保护的司法实践,存在着立法不完善、博弈双方力量失衡、缺乏激励机制等制度困境,导致我国公众参与环境保护的司法现状没有达到理想的状态。最后,从博弈分析的视角看,可以从完善法律规范体系以提高博弈效率,扩展“公众”的主体资格范围以促进博弈双方的力量均衡,实施适当的激励机制以降低公众维权成本三方面着力,实现公众参与环境司法的规范化和体系化。Game theory,as an important theory and tool for analyzing human behavior,has been fully applied in the fields of law,economics and management.Under the premise of game participants,subjective rationality and incomplete information symmetry,a dynamic game model of environmental protection between the public and the judiciary is constructed.And the conclusion is drawn that it is necessary to strengthen the institutional norms,reduce the cost of public rights protection,implement the appropriate incentive mechanism and strengthen the transparency of information.Compared with the practice of the judicial path of public participation in environmental protection in China,there are some institutional dilemmas,such as imperfect legislation,imbalance of power between the two sides of the game,lack of incentive mechanism and so on,which lead to the fact that the judicial situation of public participation in environmental protection in China has not reached the ideal state.Finally,on the basis of game analysis,this paper puts forward the corresponding measures to optimize the judicial path of public participation in environmental protection in China.It is necessary to refine the legal system to improve the efficiency of the game,expand the scope of the subject qualification of the"public"to promote the balance of power between the two sides of the game,implement appropriate incentive mechanism to reduce the cost of public rights protection,in order to realize the standardization and systematization of public participation in environmental justice.

关 键 词：博弈论 公众参与 环境司法 路径优化 

分 类 号：D912.6[政治法律—环境与资源保护法学]