委托代理视角下职务发明人权益保障机制研究  被引量:1

Research on the Rights and Interests Protection Mechanism of Service Inventors from the Perspective of Principal-agent

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作  者:曾张旭阳 曾立[2] ZENG ZHANG Xu-yang;ZENG Li(National University of Defense Technology,College of Arts and Sciences,Hunan Changsha 410073.China;National University of Defense Technology,College of Advanced Interdisciplinary Studies,Hunan Changsha 410073.China)

机构地区:[1]国防科技大学文理学院,湖南长沙410073 [2]国防科技大学前沿交叉学科学院,湖南长沙410073

出  处:《科学管理研究》2020年第3期67-71,共5页Scientific Management Research

基  金:国家社会科学基金项目(16CGL074)。

摘  要:基于委托代理视角,将职务发明看成一种由各层级、多主体共同参与的团队活动。职务发明是一条自上而下的委托代理链,也是一条自上而下的授权链。由于职务发明的特殊性,这种委托代理关系存在多头管理、利益不均、缺乏激励、利益冲突等问题。构建有效的职务发明人权益保障机制,旨在解决职务发明委托代理问题.需要贯彻以理顺管理体制为前提、以完善职务发明纠纷解决机制为路径、以健全适用于多种领域的激励约束机制为根本的思路,尽量减少委托人与代理人之间的利益不均与冲突,最终推进职务发明发展。From the perspective of principal-agent,the job invention is regarded as a team activity involving the participation of all levels and multiple agents.Service invention is a top-down principal-agent chain and a topdown authorization chain.Due to the particularity of job in ventions,this principal-agent relationship has problems such as multiple management,uneven interest,lack of incentives,and conflicts of interest.Establishing an effective service inventor rights protection mechanism,aimed at solving the problem of agency commissions,needs to implement the premise of straightening out the management system,taking the path to perfecting the service invention dispute resolution mechanism as the path,and improving the incentive and restraint mechanisms applicable to various fields As a fundamental idea,minimize the uneven interests and conflicts between the principal and the agent,and ultimately promote the development of job inventions.

关 键 词:委托代理 职务发明 权益保障 

分 类 号:D923.42[政治法律—民商法学]

 

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