竞争环境下针对双寡头回收处理商的政府激励机制设计  

Incentive mechanism between government and duopolistic recyclers based on collection competition

作　　者：曹柬[1] 张梅美[1] 许佳阳 朱晨波 周根贵[1] CAO Jian;ZHANG Meimei;XU Jiayang;ZHU Chenbo;ZHOU Gengui(School of Economics and Management,Zhejiang University of Technology,Hangzhou,310023,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江工业大学经贸管理学院,浙江杭州310023

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2020年第5期114-121,共8页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71874159、71371169、71601169);浙江省自然科学基金资助项目(LY18G020020、LQ16G010007)。

摘　　要：在有两个废旧产品回收处理企业的地区,为推动资源再生行业的发展,政府会对这两个寡头企业进行补贴。鉴于回收处理企业存在隐匿自身能力类型和努力水平这一现实行为,运用激励理论研究了政府与双寡头回收处理商之间的激励契约设计,得到了分离契约存在的条件,分析了双寡头市场中竞争程度以及其他因素对政府环境效益和企业收益的影响。研究表明,分离契约相较混同契约而言,能够有效甄别企业类型,同时实现对于企业的高效度激励;企业自身能力越强,获得政府补贴越多,企业期望收益与政府期望效用也越大;企业间竞争越激烈,政府给予企业的激励补贴越少。研究结论对于推进废旧产品回收处理的政府规制实施具有一定的指导意义。With the increasing demand for resources and growing consciousness on environment protection,more and more countries have attached importance to the resource recycling industry.The first step involves the collection and disposal of waste.However,in China,the formal recycling industry at present is still in its infancy.The market capacity of end-of-life products is relatively limited,and domestic consumers have a low awareness of formal recycling corporations.The government needs to subsidize the formal recyclers and design a reasonable and effective incentive mechanism to encourage them to improve their effort level of collection and disposal as well as reflect their real ability.In this paper,we design an incentive contract between the government and two recycling enterprises in a duopolistic market based on the incentive theory.Thus,we can get the realistic prerequisite of screening contracts and analyze the influence of competition degree and other factors on the government's utility and recyclers'benefits.Although much literature concentrates on the issue of coordinating strategy and profit distribution between government and enterprises,only a paucity of research investigates the incentive contracts used by the government and the enterprises for adverse selection and moral hazard under asymmetric information.In our model,the government acts as the principal,and the two competing duopolistic recyclers are viewed as agents.Taking the recycling capacity of recyclers as asymmetric information under adverse selection,the degree of effort as hidden information under moral hazard,the government designs an incentive contract to identify the real type of the two recyclers and encourage them to improve recycling capacity.The analysis shows that the realistic prerequisite of a pooling contract or screening contract is related to the derivative of the government subsidy to the recycler's capacity.The factors such as the cost of enterprises'efforts,coefficient of absolute risk aversion,the standard deviation of exterior

关 键 词：废旧产品处理 激励机制 不对称信息 双寡头竞争 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]