补贴时代下新能源汽车电池回收策略研究  

Research on New Energy Vehicle Battery Recycling Strategy in the Post-Subsidy Era

作　　者：申海[1] 刘杰 赵晓罡[1] 刘琴 SHEN Hai;LIU Jie;ZHAO Xiaogang;LIU Qin(Business School,Xi’an International Studies University,Xi’an 710128,China)

机构地区：[1]西安外国语大学商学院,西安710128

出　　处：《西安工业大学学报》2020年第4期455-463,共9页Journal of Xi’an Technological University

基　　金：西安外国语大学研究生科研基金(YJS2019);陕西省教育厅科研计划项目(17JK0639)。

摘　　要：针对由新能源汽车推广而带来的废旧电池回收问题,文中构建了政府外生补贴和政府内生补贴两种场景下,政府与制造商之间的博弈关系。分析了政府内生补贴场景下合作博弈与非合作博弈两种情况对电池回收率的影响,分别构建外生政府补贴与内生政府补贴的相关利润函数,对回收策略进行了研究。研究结果表明:在内生政府补贴或者外生政府补贴的场景下,最优的电池回收率在0到1的闭区间内取得;社会总福利随着政府的补贴增加而减少;当政府补贴高于制造商生产成本的50%时,最优补贴率随补贴的增加而降低。Aiming at the problem of waste battery recycling caused by the promotion of new energy vehicles,the paper establishes a game relationship between the government and manufacturers under the two scenarios of government exogenous subsidies and government endogenous subsidies.An analysis is made of the impact of the cooperative game and non-cooperative game on the battery recycling rate under the government endogenous subsidy scenario.The profit functions of exogenous government subsidies and endogenous government subsidies are constructed respectively to study the strategy for battery recycling.The study shows that under the scenario of endogenous government subsidy or exogenous government subsidy,the best battery recycling rate is within the closed range of 0 to 1,that the total social benefits decrease with the increasing government subsidies,and that when the government subsidy is higher than 50%of the manufacturer's production costs,the optimal subsidy rate decreases with the increase of the subsidy.

关 键 词：电池回收策略 博弈论 政府补贴 新能源汽车 

分 类 号：F426.471[经济管理—产业经济]