考虑回收积极性的逆向供应链协调的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Reverse Supply Chain Coordination Considering Recycling Enthusiasm

作　　者：范定祥[1] 李重莲 FAN Dingxiang;LI Chonglian(School of Economics and Business,Hunan University of Technology,Zhuzhou 412007,China;Business School,Hunan University of Technology,Zhuzhou 412007,China)

机构地区：[1]湖南工业大学经贸学院,湖南株洲412007 [2]湖南工业大学商学院,湖南株洲412007

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2020年第4期86-94,共9页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：湖南省研究生科研创新项目(CX20190853);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金课题(18YJA630001)。

摘　　要：针对当前循环经济发展扶持政策下如何提升消费者与回收企业的回收积极性问题,旨在探究一种政府推动、全民参与、市场运作、系统推进的回收管理策略。考虑由回收企业和消费者组成的两级回收供应链演化博弈模型,分析了博弈双方的演化均衡点及参数变化对回收积极性与策略的影响,探讨了不同的参数区间下政府单边惩罚补贴机制对回收供应链主体积极性提升的协调作用。最后,采用Vensim软件仿真验证了模型分析的合理性和协调机制的有效性。结果表明:博弈双方的回收积极性投入策略与其收益、成本、惩罚补贴力度以及"搭便车"收益值等因素密切相关;当回收企业和消费者均选择消极应对策略或一方积极另一方消极的搭便车策略时,政府可分别通过补贴和惩罚机制改变回收企业和消费者的双方收益矩阵,可使博弈双方均向积极参与回收的行为策略演化,并实现回收企业和消费者回收积极性最大化、政府监管成本最小化。To improve the recycling enthusiasm of consumers and recycling enterprises under the current circular economic development supporting policy,the purpose was to explore a recycling management strategy of government promotion,national participation,market operation and system promotion.The effects of evolutionary equilibrium points and parameter changes were analyzed on the recovery enthusiasm and strategy by constructing a two-stage recycling supply chain evolutionary game model consisting of recycling companies and consumers.The government had further explored the coordination role of the enthusiasm of the recycling supply chain under different parameter intervals by formulating a unilateral punishment subsidy mechanism.Finally,the Venusim software simulation was used to verify the rationality of the model analysis and the effectiveness of the coordination mechanism.The results show that the recovery enthusiasm investment strategy of both sides of the game is closely related to factors such as income,cost,punishment subsidy and"free rider"income value;when both recycling companies and consumers choose a negative coping strategy,or there is a free-riding situation in which one party chooses to actively participate in recycling and the other chooses a negative response,the government can change the income matrix of both the recycling enterprise and the consumer through subsidy and punishment mechanisms respectively,which enables both players to evolve into a behavioral strategy that actively participates in recycling,maximizes the recycling incentives of recycling companies and consumers and minimizes government regulatory costs.

关 键 词：逆向供应链 回收积极性 演化博弈 单边惩罚补贴机制 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]