地方政府生态环境治理失灵的体制性根源及其矫治  

Systematic Roots and Corrections of Local Government’s Governance Failure in Ecological Environment

作　　者：褚添有[1] Chu Tianyou

机构地区：[1]广西师范大学政治与公共管理学院,广西桂林541004

出　　处：《社会科学》2020年第8期64-75,共12页Journal of Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社科基金项目“西南边疆民族地区共建共治共享社会治理格局构建的困境及对策研究”(项目编号:18BZZ034)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：我国中央政府与地方政府的关系是一种内部的委托-代理关系。中央政府为了确保所制定的多项目标任务能够得到有效贯彻落实,就需要建立对地方政府的激励结构。因此,地方政府行为表现与中央政府提供的激励结构直接相关。改革开放以来,我国地方政府在发展经济方面表现出色,但在生态环境治理方面的表现却不令人满意,其根源就在于中央政府所提供的激励结构存在着较大的缺陷。因此,中央政府要想根治地方政府生态环境治理失灵问题,就应该立足于"五位一体"总体布局的战略高度,对原有的激励结构进行系统性重构,协调好生态环境保护与政治、经济、文化、社会之间的关系。The relationship between China’s central government and local governments is an internal principal-agent one. In order to ensure that the multiple goals and tasks formulated can be effectively implemented, the central government needs to establish an incentive structure for local governments. Therefore, the performance of local government is directly related to the incentive structure provided by the central government. Since the reform and opening up, China’s local governments have made excellent achievements in economic development, but in ecological environment governance, their performances have been unsatisfactory. The root lies in the defective incentive structure provided by the central government. Therefore, if the central government wants to rectify the local government’s governance failure in ecological environment, it should restructure the original incentive structure systematically based on the strategic five-sphere integrated plan and coordinate ecological environment protection with politics, economy, culture and society.

关 键 词：中央政府 地方政府 委托-代理关系 生态环境治理失灵 激励结构 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学] X321[政治法律—中外政治制度]