可拆分多物品的拍卖—谈判采购机制设计  

A Procurement Mechanism for Multiple Splittable Items Based on Auction and Negotiation

作　　者：王娜 汪定伟[2] 王洪峰[2] WANG Na;WANG Ding-wei;WANG Hong-feng(Fundamental Teaching Department of Computer and Mathematics,Shenyang Normal University,Shenyang 110034,China;College of Information Science and Engineering,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110819,China)

机构地区：[1]沈阳师范大学计算机与数学基础教学部,辽宁沈阳110034 [2]东北大学信息科学与工程学院,辽宁沈阳110819

出　　处：《控制工程》2020年第8期1401-1405,共5页Control Engineering of China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年基金项目(61703290);辽宁省自然科学基金指导计划项目(2019-ZD-0478)。

摘　　要：针对可拆分多物品采购中的供需不匹配问题,提出了一种拍卖—谈判的两轮采购机制。对于这种新型采购机制中3个关键的科学问题,即胜标人确定问题、胜标人谈判顺序问题以及谈判终止原则问题,分别给出了具体的解决方案。首先按照逆向拍卖方式,以期望采购节省最大化为目标,确定胜标者集合;接着按照收益最大化原则确定谈判顺序,并按照谈判终止原则结束谈判,从而确定最终胜标人对不同标的物的供应单价和供应量。仿真实验结果表明了所提出的拍卖—谈判的两轮采购机制能够较为有效的解决可拆分多物品的采购问题。To solve the mismatch between supply and demand in multiple splittable items procurement,a new procurement mechanism of auction and negotiation is proposed in this paper.Three key scientific problems are solved,which are winner determination,negotiation order and termination condition of negotiation.Firstly,the set of winning bidders is obtained with maximizing the expected procurement savings by means of reverse auction.Then the negotiation sequence is determined according to the principle of revenue maximization,and the negotiation is concluded according to the principle of termination of negotiation.Finally the final supply results of different objects is obtained.The numerical examples show that above procurement mechanism can solve the problem of multiple splittable items procurement effectively.

关 键 词：可拆分多物品 采购 逆向拍卖 谈判 拍卖机制设计 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]