电商平台市场信息策略选择及其治理目标激励——基于苏宁易购十类第三方商品数据的理论与实证研究  

The Information Strategy Selection and Governance Target Incentives in E-commerce Platform Market:Theoretical and Empirical Research Based on Data from Suning Third-part Commodities

作　　者：邹佳[1] 马敏 ZOU Jia;MA Min

机构地区：[1]山西财经大学管理科学与工程学院

出　　处：《产经评论》2020年第4期26-47,共22页Industrial Economic Review

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“基于不同预期条件的双边平台最优价格博弈时序研究”(项目编号:17YJC630240,项目负责人:邹佳)。

摘　　要：电商平台市场普遍存在着的过度宣传、虚假评论以及刷单炒信等现象,凸显出信息不对称问题的严重性。与一般的信息不对称问题不同,电商平台市场的信息不对称问题是平台企业、消费者(买方)和供应商(卖方)三方参与者策略行为共同作用导致的,而且平台企业兼具参与者和治理者的双重角色。从消费者有限理性预期理论出发,分析垄断市场中平台企业的信息策略选择,探究电商平台市场质量信息不对称问题的产生,治理困境形成的原因,以及“平台企业-政府”共同参与的多方治理路径。运用苏宁易购十类第三方商品数据对消费者预期的有限理性进行实证检验。结果显示:消费者预期质量与实际质量的差异决定了平台企业选择使消费者完全信息还是缺乏信息的策略;平台企业对信息不对称问题的治理会出现激励不足、激励相容约束以及目标冲突三类问题,而这三类问题的产生取决于消费者预期质量与实际质量之间的差距以及平台企业收费水平这两个因素;使消费者的预期变得更加理性是治理电商平台市场质量信息不对称问题的一个市场化手段。The phenomenon of over publicizing,fake reviews and speculative deals and reputation in the e-commerce platform market highlights the seriousness of information asymmetry.Different from the traditional information asymmetry problem,that of in e-commerce platform market is the result of the strategic actions implemented by the market participants which are e-commerce platform,consumers(buyer)and supplier(seller),and the platform has the dual roles of participant and governor.We explain the generation of asymmetry in the quality information of the e-commerce platform market through the choice of platform company's information strategies,explore the causes of their governance dilemmas and then build a multi-party governance path in which platform companies and governments participate based on consumers'limited rational expectations.At last,the bounded rationality of consumer expectations is empirically tested by data from Suning third-part commodities.The following conclusions are drawn in a monopoly situation:The difference between consumers'expected quality and actual quality determines the strategy that platform companies choose to make consumers complete or lack information;the governance of information asymmetry by platform companies will have three types of problems:insufficient incentives,incentive compatibility constraints,and goal conflicts,which are generated from the gap between the expected and actual quality of consumers and the fees charged by platform companies;making consumers'expectations more rational is a market-oriented means to relieve the asymmetry of quality information in the e-commerce platform market.

关 键 词：电商平台 信息不对称 理性预期 市场治理 信息策略选择 

分 类 号：F062.5[经济管理—政治经济学] F062.9