基于信号博弈的网络主动防御研究  

Research on Network Active Defense Based on Signaling Game

作　　者：王增光 卢昱 李玺 WANG Zeng-guang;LU Yu;LI Xi(Joint Operations College,National Defense University,Shijiazhuang 050084,China;Shijiazhuang Campus of Army Engineering University,Shijiazhuang 050003,China)

机构地区：[1]国防大学联合作战学院,石家庄050084 [2]陆军工程大学石家庄校区,石家庄050003

出　　处：《火力与指挥控制》2020年第8期119-124,共6页Fire Control & Command Control

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(61271152);国家青年科学基金(61602505);国家社会科学基金军事学资助项目(15GJ003-184)。

摘　　要：针对现有被动防御方式难以有效确保军事信息网络安全的问题,从信号伪装的角度对军事信息网络的主动防御进行研究,提出了一种最优伪装信号选取方法。在分析军事信息网络攻防对抗的基础上,基于信号博弈理论对网络攻防过程进行建模;提出了网络攻防收益量化方法;在精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡分析的基础上,设计了最优伪装信号的选取算法。通过实验验证了方法的合理性和可行性,为军事信息网络安全防御提供了一种新的思路。As the existing passive defense methods can not effectively ensure the security of military information network,the active defense of military information network is studied from the perspective of signal camouflage,and an optimal method of camouflage signal selection is proposed.The process of network attack-defense is modeled based on signaling game theories on the basis of analyzing the attack-defense confrontation of military information network.Quantitative method of network attack-defense payoff is proposed.An optimal camouflage signal selection algorithm is designed on the basis of perfect Nash equilibrium analysis.The rationality and feasibility of the method is verified by experiments,a new idea is provided for military information network security defense.

关 键 词：军事信息网络 不完全信息 信号博弈 精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡 最优伪装信号 

分 类 号：TJ01[兵器科学与技术—兵器发射理论与技术] E92[军事—军事装备学]