Real option-based optimization for financial incentive allocation in infrastructure projects under publicprivate partnerships  

作　　者：Shuai LI Da HU Jiannan CAI Hubo CAI 

机构地区：[1]Department of Civil and Envronmental Engineering,University of Tennessee,Knoxville,TN 37996,USA [2]Lyles School of Civil Engineering,Purdue University,West Lafayette,IN 47907,USA

出　　处：《Frontiers of Engineering Management》2020年第3期413-425,共13页工程管理前沿（英文版）

摘　　要：Financial incentives that stimulate energy investments under public-private partnerships are considered scarce public resources,which require deliberate allocation to the most economically justified projects to maximize the social benefits.This study aims to solve the financial incentive allocation problem through a real option-based nonlinear integer programming approach.Real option theory is leveraged to determine the optimal timing and the corresponding option value of providing financial incentives.The ambiguity in the evolution of social benefits,the decision-maker’s attitude toward ambiguity,and the uncertainty in social benefits and incentive costs are all considered.Incentives are offered to the project portfolio that generates the maximum total option value.The project portfolio selection is formulated as a stochastic knapsack problem with random option values in the objective flinction and random incentive costs in the probabilistic budget constraint.The linear probabilistic budget constraint is subsequently transformed into a nonlinear deterministic one.Finally,the integer non-linear programming problem is solved,and the optimality gap is computed to assess the quality of the optimal solution.A case study is presented to illustrate how the limited financial incentives can be optimally allocated under uncertainty and ambiguity,which demonstrates the efficacy of the proposed method.

关 键 词：financial incentives public-private partnerships energy infrastructure projects real option OPTIMIZATION UNCERTAINTY 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学] U445.1[建筑科学—桥梁与隧道工程] U455.1[交通运输工程—道路与铁道工程]