供应商融资中买方担保机制的价值影响研究  

The impact of buyer guarantee mechanism on financing suppliers program

作　　者：黄佳舟 鲁其辉[2] 陈祥锋[1] HUANG Jia-zhou;LU Qi-hui;CHEN Xiang-feng(School of Management,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China;School of Business Administration,Zhejiang Gongshang University,Hangzhou 310018,China)

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433 [2]浙江工商大学工商管理学院,杭州310018

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2020年第7期99-115,共17页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71872051,71472049,71531005,71629001,91746302,71672179);浙江省哲学社会科学基金资助项目(15NDJC150YB);教育部人文社会科学研究基金资助项目(15YJC630083)。

摘　　要：文章分析了资金约束供应商和资金充足零售商组成的供应链中,买方提供融资担保机制对各参与方和供应链整体价值的影响.研究表明:当综合融资成本与传统供应商融资模式的融资成本相等时,买方替代了银行角色承受了融资风险,但双方不存在共赢的局面;当综合融资成本较低时,在一定条件下,买方担保机制能够实现帕累托改进效应,达到三方共赢;反之,买方担保机制的帕累托改进效应消失.This paper studies the impact of buyer guarantee mechanism on all members in a supply chain,which is consist of a capital-constrained supplier and a capital-rich buyer.It is found that if the synthetic financing rate is equal to the financing rate in the traditional supplier financing,the buyer bears the financing risk instead of the bank and there is no possibility that the bank and the buyer can both benefit from the buyer guarantee mechanism;if the synthetic financing rate is lower,a Pareto improvement where all members can benefit from the buyer guarantee mechanism exists under certain circumstances.Otherwise,Pareto improvement cannot be achieved.

关 键 词：供应链金融 供应商融资 买方担保 担保机制 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学]