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作 者:许汝俊 侯衡 XU Ru-jun;HOU Heng(School of Economic and Management,Hubei University of Technology,Wuhan 430068,China;Shenzhen Graduate School,Peking University,Shenzhen 518055,China)
机构地区:[1]湖北工业大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430068 [2]北京大学深圳研究生院,广东深圳518055
出 处:《现代财经(天津财经大学学报)》2020年第9期47-63,共17页Modern Finance and Economics:Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
基 金:国家社会科学基金项目(13BJY014);中南财经政法大学优博项目(2018Y1147)。
摘 要:近年来股票回购行为热情高涨,相关内部治理机制问题也引人关注,尤其是管理层基于分析师预测可能存在的相关机会主义行为。本文首次基于交易成本理论及展望理论,从迎合视角研究了分析师预测与股票回购之间的行为关系,发现管理层股票回购行为具有迎合分析师预测的择时动机。进一步地,本文也发现低融资约束及低盈余管理下,管理层迎合分析师预测进而进行股票回购的行为更为明显。本研究为规范上市公司股票回购行为、引导投资者价值投资提供参考与借鉴。In recent years,the enthusiasm of stock repurchase has been rising.The related internal governance mechanism,especially the possible opportunistic behavior of management based on analysts’ forecast,has also attracted attention.Based on the theory of transaction cost and prospect theory,this paper studies the relationship between analysts’ forecast behavior and management’s stock repurchase from the perspective of catering.Furthermore,it is also found that under the conditions of low financing constraints and low earnings management,the management’s behavior of catering to analysts’ predictions and then making stock repurchases is more obvious.This study provides references for standardizing the stock repurchase behavior of listed companies and guiding the investors’ value investment.
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