基于电子商务B2B平台的个性化定制产品供应链治理结构重复博弈分析  

Repeated Game Model of Supply Chain Governance for Personalized Customization Products Based on E-commerce B2B Platform

作　　者：姜明[1] 李洪心[1] 刘德海[1] JIANG ming;LI Hong-xin;LIU De-hai(School of Management Science and Engineering, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian 116025, China)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学管理科学与工程学院,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2020年第8期45-51,72,共8页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71874024,71571033,71571035);东北财经大学提升社会服务能力建设项目(XCZX-Z2002)。

摘　　要：个性化定制产品的供应链上下游企业合作面临着双边道德风险问题,电子商务B2B平台提供了该问题的一种有效治理模式,但是也存在着平台企业索要商业贿赂等自身治理问题。本文构建了电子商务平台的个性化定制产品的供应链治理重复博弈模型,分析了定制化产品的供应链双边道德风险治理结构,以及平台自身的激励问题。研究结果表明,第一,通过电商平台的信息检索服务,可以有效规避双边道德风险问题,达成帕雷托最优的供应链上下游合作。第二,为了加强电子商务平台的自身治理问题,需要采取“按效果收费”制度,完善用户反馈信息记录,尤其是加强行业自律,提高电子商务平台的社会公信力和市场声誉。The enterprises with personalized customization products often face the dual moral hazard problems in supply chain cooperation.The B2B E-commerce platform provides the effective governance.However,they still face the own governance problems such as the platform demands bribes.The paper uses the repeated game model to analyze the governance structure of supply chain for dual moral hazard problem in personalized customization products,and the incentive problem of e-commerce platform.The results show the two main conclusions.Firstly,the information disclosure of e-commerce platform can effectively avoid the dual moral hazard problems and reach the cooperative relationship.Secondly,the e-commerce enterprise should improve own governance,for example,changing by the information service effect,improving the feedback information for the user,reinforcing the industrial self-discipline to improve the social reputation of e-commerce.

关 键 词：电子商务B2B平台 重复博弈模型 供应链管理 市场治理结构 双边道德风险 

分 类 号：C939[经济管理—管理学]