合同能源管理项目中的节能补贴分配问题研究  

Investigating Allocation of Energy Saving Subsidies in Energy Performance ContractingProjects

作　　者：张文杰 袁红平 ZHANG Wen-jie;YUAN Hong-ping(School of Economics, Guangxi University for Nationalities, Nanning 530006, China;School of Management, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, China)

机构地区：[1]广西民族大学经济学院,广西南宁530006 [2]广州大学管理学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2020年第8期233-239,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71573216);广东省自然科学基金资助项目(2019A1515011794)。

摘　　要：政府节能补贴是有效推进合同能源管理项目发展的一个关键要素。围绕合同能源管理项目,以优化资源配置为目的,通过构建“委托-代理”模型研究了项目中的节能补贴分配问题。研究发现:①当仅给予项目中的用能方或节能服务公司中任何一方节能补贴时,项目最优节能量主要取决于节能补贴标准;②当节能补贴由项目双方共享时,项目最优节能量不但受节能补贴标准影响,还受项目双方节能补贴讨价还价能力影响;③当节能补贴全部给予节能服务公司时,项目可实现最优节能量。④当节能补贴全部给予项目中的任何一方时,获补贴方的节能收益达到最优。Energy saving subsidies provided by the government is critical to promoting energy performance contracting(EPC)projects.To optimize resource allocation inEPC projects,this paper developsa principal-agent model to investigate the distribution of energy saving subsidies in EPC projects.The findings show that when the saving subsidies are provided only to the energy user(EU)or the energy service company(ESCO),the optimal energy saving will be affected by the energy subsidies standard.When the saving subsidies are shared by both parties,the optimal energy saving will be not only influenced by the energy subsidies standard,but also determined by the two parties’bargaining capabilities.When the saving subsidies are all provided to the ESCO,the project can achieve the optimal situation for energy savings.Furthermore,when the saving subsidies are all provided to either party in the project,the party receiving the saving subsidies can obtain the optimal energy saving profits.

关 键 词：合同能源管理 节能补贴 “委托-代理”模型 

分 类 号：F206[经济管理—国民经济]