不同权力结构下存在搭便车行为的双渠道供应链决策研究  

RESEARCH ON DECISION-MAKING OF TWO-CHANNEL SUPPLY CHAIN WITH FREE-RIDER BEHAVIOR UNDER DIFFERENT POWER STRUCTURES

作　　者：胡钢[1] 秦培培 HU Gang;QIN Pei-pei(School of Management Science&Engineering,Anhui University of Technology,Maanshan 243000,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽工业大学管理科学与工程学院,安徽马鞍山243000

出　　处：《南阳理工学院学报》2020年第2期1-6,16,共7页Journal of Nanyang Institute of Technology

基　　金：青年科学基金资助项目(61702006)。

摘　　要：本文就不同权利结构下消费者搭便车行为的双渠道供应链进行博弈分析。构建集中式、制造商主导的Stackelberg博弈、零售商主导的Stackelberg博弈和Nash均衡博弈等决策模型,分析搭便车行为对供应链定价和利润的影响。得出结论:传统零售价格随着搭便车系数的增大而减小;直销零售价格在集中决策下随着搭便车系数的增大而增大,其他3种决策模型,直销零售价格与搭便车系数无关;批发价格随着搭便车系数的增大而增大;零售商利润和供应链总利润随着搭便车系数的增大而减小,制造商的利润随着搭便车系数的增大而增大;供应链成员的利润在不同决策权力结构主导下不同。This paper makes a game analysis on the two-channel supply chain of free-rider behavior of consumers under different rights structures.The decision models of centralized Stackelberg game,manufacturer-led Stackelberg game,retailer-led Stackelberg game and Nash equilibrium game are constructed to analyze the impact of free-rider behavior on Supply Chain Pricing and profit.The conclusion is drawn as follows: the traditional retail price decreases with the increase of free-rider coefficient;the direct retail price increases with the increase of free-rider coefficient under centralized decision-making;the other three decision-making models show that the direct retail price has nothing to do with free-rider coefficient;the wholesale price increases with the increase of free-rider coefficient;the retailer’s profit and the free-rider coefficient increase The total profit of supply chain decreases with the increase of free-rider coefficient,while the profit of manufacturer increases with the increase of free-rider coefficient.The profit of members of supply chain varies under different decision-making power structures.

关 键 词：双渠道供应链 决策 搭便车行为 STACKELBERG博弈 NASH均衡博弈 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学] O223[理学—运筹学与控制论]